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ABSTRACT
This research explores the connections between campaign contributions, congres-
sional behavior, and electoral outcomes. Previous research on the role of money in
politics has focused primarily on the influence of political action committees and
other organized interests, despite the fact that individual contributions account for
over 50 percent of the donations members of Congress receive. This research ad-
dresses the influence members’ financial ties with aﬄuent individual donors has on
their roll call voting, bill sponsorship, and primary election prospects. The results
suggest big donors shift members further to the ideological right and decrease their
likelihood of introducing direct government spending bills in Congress. These finan-
cial ties also influence the electoral landscape for incumbents in the primary elec-
tion by giving Republican incumbents an electoral edge and increasing the chances
Democratic incumbents face a tough primary election battle. This research suggests
individual donors influence political outcomes with implications for policy outcomes,
representation, and party polarization.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There is growing public concern about the role of money in politics. The pub-
lic discussion about the connections between wealth, campaign contributions, and
influence in the American political system is prompted by several trends, including
growing economic inequality and the increasingly large amount of money spent on
federal election campaigns. As these changes in the economic and political land-
scape occur, academics, the media, and the public are beginning to question how
these changes influence policymaking and political outcomes. Does greater economic
power translate into greater political power?
Recent research suggests it might. For instance, politicians tend to be more
responsive to the political preferences of high-income voters. Voters across the income
distribution share similar views on many policy issues. But when their opinions differ,
members of Congress tend to be more responsive to the preferences of middle- and
especially high-income voters (Gilens 2012; Bartels 2008). Though these studies
suggest more aﬄuent voters may have greater influence over policy outcomes, the
mechanism through which greater responsiveness to more aﬄuent voters occurs is
not examined.
Campaign finance is an obvious culprit. The logic is that campaign contribu-
tions enable donors to exert a larger influence on the political process. Scholars
have explored the role of money in politics for a long time, however, with at best
mixed evidence that donors impact political outcomes. Evidence that money buys
influence and affects political outcomes has been surprisingly hard to find. The
majority of scholarly research on this topic has focused on contributions by political
action committees, corporations, and other organized interests, rather than campaign
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contributions from individual donors. While the focus on organized interests is rea-
sonable in many ways, contributions from individuals account for over 50 percent of
the campaign funds members of Congress raise.
This research contributes to our understanding of the role of money in politics by
examining the influence of individual donors on congressional behavior and electoral
outcomes. In particular, this research addresses three related topics: 1) the influence
of big donors on roll call voting and ideological extremity in Congress, 2) the impact
big donors have on the policy agenda and the types of policies members of Congress
propose, and 3) the effect campaign funding from big donors has on incumbents’
electoral prospects in the congressional primaries.
The results suggest campaign contributions from wealthy donors influence the
behavior of members of Congress and political outcomes. Members of Congress who
receive a greater share of their campaign funds from big donors have more conserva-
tive roll call voting records than would be expected given the political composition of
their district and sponsor fewer direct government spending bills. While these effects
are found among members of both parties, however, these contributions affect the
electoral fortunes of Democrats and Republicans differently. Democratic members of
Congress are disadvantaged by these contributions during the primary election and
more likely to face a strong primary challenger, perhaps because their representation
of donor interests in Congress places them at odds with Democratic primary voters.
In contrast, Republican members benefit from their relationships with big donors
during the primary election. Taken together, the results suggest the relationship be-
tween big donors and members of Congress has important implications for political
outcomes in the United States. The chapters that follow explore these relationships
in greater detail.
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2. THE IMPACT OF BIG DONORS ON IDEOLOGICAL EXTREMITY IN
THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2.1 Introduction
Political polarization is a defining feature of the contemporary American political
system. The two major parties in Congress have become more ideologically distinct
from one another while internally becoming more ideologically homogenous. This
trend towards polarized parties has continued in almost every year since the mid-
1970s. The Democrats and Republicans in the 112th Congress, elected in the 2010
midterm election, were the most polarized Congress since the end of Reconstruc-
tion.1 Empirical studies clearly demonstrate that the parties are becoming more
polarized. In day to day politics, this long-term trend towards polarized parties is
also readily apparent and appears in many forms including more divisive and uncivil
political discourse and intense policy gridlock. The causes and consequences of party
polarization have been widely studied (e.g., Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003;
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Theriault 2008). Studies of party polarization
almost exclusively seek to explain the growing distance between the two parties; until
recently, the asymmetric nature of polarization has often been underappreciated.
Both parties—Democrats and Republicans—have moved away from the ideolog-
ical center over the past 40 years, but the Republican Party has tacked dramatically
rightward at a pace unmatched by the Democratic Party. Political scientists, most
notably Hacker and Pierson (2005), have recognized the asymmetries in party po-
larization for about a decade, but this idea has also made its way into mainstream
1According to DW-NOMINATE scores acquired from Voteview
(http://voteview.com/dwnominate.asp), and described in greater detail by Poole and Rosen-
thal (1997).
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political discourse in recent years (see., e.g., Mann and Ornstein 2012, and the re-
action to their book). Thus far, explanations for asymmetric polarization have been
somewhat unbalanced—they focus primarily on why the Republican Party has moved
so sharply to the right. While this question is undeniably important, considering why
the Democratic Party has failed to follow them to the ideological extremes is also
important. In addition, there is disagreement over the factors driving asymmetric
polarization. Are elites moving outward in spite of voters, or do voter preferences
play a key role? By some accounts, such as Hacker and Pierson (2005) and Frank
(2004), the greater movement of the Republican Party away from the center is pri-
marily elite driven and not a consequence of a changing electorate. Other accounts
ascribe at least some of the asymmetry to changes in the composition of voters and
voter opinions (Butler 2009).
This research shows the linkages between campaign donors and members’ ide-
ological positions and in doing so, offers a potential explanation for the observed
asymmetry that lies somewhere in between these two alternatives. In particular, I
argue electoral factors are partially responsible for the differential ideological move-
ment of the Democratic and Republican parties, however, I focus on an especially
elite group of voters—individual high dollar donors who make large campaign con-
tributions to candidates. Reelection-seeking members of Congress who are more
reliant on individual big donors as an important source of their campaign funding
have strong incentives to respond by altering their ideological positioning during the
election and their subsequent roll-call voting once (re)elected, because these donors
are central to their fundraising strategy and their ability to win the race for resources.
While candidates from both parties receive donations from high dollar donors, this
paper demonstrates donors have a different impact on members of the two parties.
Though the political preferences of individual big donors and the Republican base
4
often align, this is not always the case for Democratic donors and voters. Balancing
the distinct preferences of their district and big donors constrains the leftward move-
ment of both individual candidates who win (re)election and the Democratic Party
as a whole.
I pair data on the roll-call voting behavior of members of Congress with Federal
Election Commission data on members’ campaign donations to examine the impact
of individual big donors on the ideological positions, namely the ideological extremity,
of members of Congress. Party polarization is an aggregate pattern that results from
decisions made by individual members of Congress to stake out positions away from
the ideological center. By examining the impact of donors on members’ divergence
from the center, this study addresses one of the potential explanations underlying
whether members choose to move to the ideological extremes. The results demon-
strate that donors do impact the ideological placement of members of Congress; when
individual big donors are an important source of a member’s campaign funds, Demo-
cratic members take more centrist positions and Republican members take positions
that are at least as or more extreme than would be predicted given the composition
of their districts. Although I do not directly test the impact of this relationship
on polarization over time, the differential responsiveness of Democratic and Repub-
lican members of Congress to campaign donors has important implications for the
observed asymmetries in party polarization.
2.2 Literature Review
This study aims to advance a donor-based explanation of the observed asymmetric
polarization apparent in Congress over the past few decades. Party polarization
in Congress is ultimately the result of 535 individual members pursuing their own
goals—the number one goal being reelection (Mayhew 1974). Members’ reelection
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motives are particularly important to the theory articulated in this study because I
argue the ideological movement of members is driven by the electoral incentives to
attract and maintain relationships with individual high dollar donors. Thus, a good
starting point for explaining the degree to which individual members diverge from
the ideological center once elected to Congress is examining the factors contributing
to candidate divergence during congressional elections.2
The ideological positioning of congressional candidates, including members of
Congress seeking reelection, is carefully calculated to maximize their chance of win-
ning. Starting with Downs (1957), candidate placement has typically been discussed
in terms of the factors driving the degree of candidate convergence to the median
voter. The traditional Downsian model predicted convergence to the median voter
when two candidates try to position themselves to maximize their vote share. In con-
gressional elections, candidate convergence to the median voter is rarely observed,
however. Rather than converging to the center, Democrats and Republicans choose
distinct ideological positions during elections (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart
2001; Burden 2004; Erikson and Wright 1997) and in Congress (Poole and Rosenthal
1997). Candidate divergence during elections, which leads to ideological divergence
in Congress, is influenced by multiple factors.
Most theories of candidate divergence link candidates’ ideological positioning to
their districts’ preferences and the preferences of constituency subgroups. Demo-
cratic and Republican candidates tend to diverge across every congressional district,
but the degree of their divergence depends on the extremity of their district’s polit-
ical preferences. Democrats and Republicans from relatively moderate districts are
2This study assumes the positioning decisions congressional candidates make during the elec-
tion directly translate into their ideological positions in Congress. This assumption is common in
empirical studies of candidate placement (see, e.g., Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Moon
2004; Butler 2009.
6
less likely tend to take extreme ideological positions than those from more extreme
districts (Erikson and Wright 2000). In addition to the preference of the district as
a whole, candidates may diverge because they must appeal to multiple constituency
groups within the district. In particular, primary voters and candidates’ partisan
base exert independent influences on candidate placement. Primary voters and co-
partisans both pull candidates away from the ideological center towards the ideolog-
ical extremes. Although there is some disagreement about the relative importance
of these two factors, the literature suggests primary voters and candidates’ partisan
base more generally encourage candidate divergence because candidates must win a
primary election race, which in many cases are closed primaries (Adams and Merrill
2008; Burden 2004), and partisan voters may fail to turn out on election day if their
candidate is too moderate (Butler 2009; Aldrich 1983).
The notion that candidates diverge from the center to ensure their key supporters
mobilize and vote for them has also been applied to participation by another group of
party activists—donors—who may choose not to contribute if a candidate moves too
far to the center. Studies of candidate divergence assume party activists, including
donors, reward candidates who adopt more ideologically extreme positions, which
encourages candidates seeking donations to move away from center (Moon 2004;
Aldrich 1983; Stone and Simas 2010). In these models, donors are considered a
small, ideologically homogenous subset of primary activists who are more extreme
than the median voter in the district and at least as extreme as the typical partisan
in the district.
2.3 Theory
My theoretical framework builds on the current theories of candidate divergence.
I also assume candidates choose their ideological position by balancing competing
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considerations, in particular how to simultaneously attract the constituencies who
will help them win the race for votes without alienating those who help them win
the race for resources. Members of Congress in my framework do not necessarily
win the race for resources by becoming more ideologically extreme; however, in some
cases, donors actually moderate the ideological positioning of members. This paper
argues that individual donors who contribute large sums to congressional campaigns
(high dollar donors) have political preferences that are distinct from other important
subsets members respond to, such as primary voters and party identifiers. Although
responding to these donors may cause members’ ideological position to diverge from
their districts’ preferences, members who rely on big donors to fund their campaign do
not want to risk losing their support. Alienating them and losing their contributions
makes winning the campaign for resources, and by extension the election, more
difficult.
Candidates running for Congress have strong incentives to perfect their ability
to raise money from big donors; acquiring fundraising skills is critical for building a
successful campaign organization and winning elections. Although candidates who
raise large amounts of money are not always electorally successful, candidate quality
is often associated (conceptually and empirically) with candidates’ ability to amass
a sizable war chest. Cultivating relationships with big donors is an effective strat-
egy for candidates. Raising money requires candidates to expend time and other
resources. Tapping into large individual donors is efficient. These donors are geo-
graphically concentrated and likely to be repeat donors who contribute each election
cycle (Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski 2006). By traveling to these districts and con-
tacting individuals who can be counted on to contribute, candidates can raise larger
sums of money using fewer resources. Consider a candidate (Candidate A) who raises
$100,000 in a single weekend, by attending three fundraising events and raising over
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a $1000 dollars from each individual there. This candidate can raise more money
much quicker than a candidate (Candidate B) whose strategy involves contacting
potential donors in a range of locations. Candidate A is interacting with habitual
givers who are more likely to give and more likely to give large amounts. Candidate
B’s hit rate is probably much lower. The campaign has to contact many more indi-
viduals to amass the same number of donors and even then, the amount each donor
gives and the total amount raised is likely to be much lower. Candidate B spends
longer than one weekend raising less than $100,000.
Not every candidate has the ability to be Candidate A, but candidates can poten-
tially improve their connections with these important donors by creating a distinctive
political or ideological identity that these donors can relate to, motivating them to
give to this candidate in particular. Once a candidate does hone these skills and is
able to tap into this group of big donors, they have powerful incentives to continue
to cultivate these relationships and respond to this group of donors. Unlike primary
voters whose choice is limited to the candidates who run in their own district’s pri-
mary, donors can choose from a large pool of candidates. Candidates who are able to
connect with big donors may be motivated to alter their behavior to maintain these
relationships.
It may also be easier for candidates to respond to these individuals than vot-
ers in their district. Starting with Converse (1964), numerous studies have docu-
mented the incoherence of the public’s political attitudes. The typical voter does
not have structured well organized political beliefs. Although voters in the aggre-
gate can send signals about their political preferences (see, e.g., Erikson, MacKuen,
and Stimson 2002), these aggregate signals are often unstable even on salient policy
issues (Barabas 2006). In contrast, repeated personal interaction with high dollar
donors may give members of Congress more accurate and nuanced insight into this
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group’s political preferences. Armed with higher quality information from these in-
dividuals, members of Congress may rely on this information when deciding how
to vote in Congress, especially on issues like free trade or financial regulation that
are less salient to the mass public. Members of Congress have incentives to respond
to donors’ preferences on these issues to maintain their connection to important
fundraising networks and it may be easier for them to do so, particularly on issues
where public opinion in their district is incoherent. There are clearly reasons mem-
bers might respond to high dollar donors when they rely on them as an important
source of campaign funds, but how does responding to these donors’ preferences alter
members’ ideological placement and voting behavior in Congress?
High dollar donors within each party likely have political preferences that are re-
markably similar to one another yet distinct from the party’s broader partisan base.
Congressional campaign donors are not a representative random sample of voters
in the United States. Individual donors are not evenly distributed across congres-
sional districts; a majority of individual contributions to congressional candidates
come from individuals residing in a small subset of congressional districts, known
as donor districts (Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2008). Donor districts are
not representative of the typical congressional districts. On average, these districts
are wealthier, more educated, and more urban (Gimpel et al. 2008) and so are the
donors who live within them (Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell, and Wilcox 2003).
Donors are atypical members of the general electorate and this fact is even more
true for individuals who make large campaign donations. These big donors reside in
an even smaller number of congressional districts that are usually more similar to one
another than their partisanship would suggest. High dollar donors to both Demo-
cratic and Republican candidates are geographically concentrated and candidates
often raise money from the same districts, regardless of their partisanship (Bramlett,
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Gimpel, and Lee 2011; Gimpel et al. 2006). These patterns suggest that in addition
to being atypical relative to the general electorate, large individual contributions
often come from individuals that are atypical relative to their party’s partisan base.
Party activists and primary voters also tend to be more aﬄuent and educated
than the typical American voter. These similarities between donors, party activists,
and primary voters have frequently led to the assumption that the political prefer-
ences of these groups are highly correlated. When candidates make choices about
what ideological position to adopt and what their voting behavior should be, the
assumption is that responding to any or all of these subsets moves members in the
same direction—outward. Republicans become more conservative if they decide to
appeal to the base, primary voters or donors, and Democrats become more liberal.
In these accounts, increasing ideological extremity in Congress is partially driven by
the growing extremity of these subsets or an increase in the members’ responsiveness
to them.
But the relative aﬄuence of donors in general, especially high dollar donors, and
the increased correspondence between income and partisanship suggests that the
overlap between these subsets (primary voters, the party base and donors) may not
be complete for members of both parties. Income has become a stronger predictor
of partisanship of the past fifty years. High-income and low-income voters increas-
ingly identify themselves as Republicans and Democrats, respectively (Gelman 2008;
McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006). High-income voters are also more likely to
choose their partisanship on the basis of cultural issues (Gelman 2008). Aﬄuent
social liberals are likely to identify as Democrats and aﬄuent social conservatives
are likely to identify as Republicans.
High-income social conservatives likely share many of their political beliefs with
other members of the Republican party base, given the party emphasis on lower-
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ing taxes, deregulating the economy and advancing a conservative social agenda.
Differences in opinions between donors and the party base are more likely in the
Democratic Party. As high-income individuals, their partisanship is largely driven
by their stance on social issues, however, they may not share the party’s affinity for
higher taxes (corporate and income) and greater regulation of businesses and the
financial industry. In this scenario, responding to big donors should not pull Demo-
cratic members to the ideological extremes because their preferences are likely more
centrist than the ideological leanings of much of the party base and at odds with
parts of the Democratic party brand.
The political preferences of the Republican party base, primary voters and high
dollar donors are more likely to have a high degree of similarity, particularly on
economic issues that are central to the party brand and make up the majority of
members’ roll call voting records. Responding to the ideological preferences of high
dollar donors should alter members’ ideological positioning in the same direction as
responding to the party base at the expense of swing voters. So Republican members
who cultivate relationships with big donors and respond to their political preferences
should be at least as conservative as expected based on their district, if not more so.
The preferences of these groups are in agreement and all push Republican members
in the same direction.
Democratic members who have connections with big donors and rely on their fi-
nancial support are more likely to face important tradeoffs. Appealing to high dollar
donors may mean diverging from the party base and primary voters because donors’
economic opinions may be divergent from the party base’s even though their social
preferences are more congruent. This balancing act should moderate Democratic
members’ ideological position when their fundraising strategy is to raise money effi-
ciently by creating and maintaining relationships with individual donors who donate
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large amounts of money. High dollar donors do not have to be economic conserva-
tives to cause members to assume more moderate positions; they just have to be
more conservative than the other groups members respond to, such as their primary
electorate. If these donors have this distinct set of preferences, Democratic members
who heavily rely on high dollar donors should be more moderate than their district
composition implies.
In sum, members have incentives to respond to high dollar donors because it
helps them effectively compete in the campaign for resources. Not all candidates
can cultivate relationships with these important donor networks and tap into this
resource for a substantial portion of their campaign funding. But for those members
who can and do, there are powerful incentives to maintain this financial support base
by responding to donors’ preferences. Members also have higher quality information
about these individuals’ political attitudes on a range of policy issues, potentially
making responding simpler than responding to their district more generally. Republi-
can donors are more likely to have issue positions that are consistent with the party’s
base and their party brand than Democratic donors. These differences should cause
Democratic members who rely on and respond to high dollar donors to moderate
their ideological position, while Republican members who respond should be at least
as ideologically extreme as their district would suggest. In the aggregate, the polit-
ical involvement of high dollar donors and the important fundraising function they
serve should constrain the ideological extremity of the Democratic party in Congress
while encouraging the Republicans’ increasing extremity.
2.4 Data and Methods
Since I am interested in providing an electoral explanation for asymmetric party
polarization in Congress, the empirical tests of the theory use data on House mem-
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bers’ roll call voting behavior. Roll call voting data allows me to draw more mean-
ingful conclusions about how the pressure to raise money from high dollar donors
impacts roll call voting, with implications for the observed patterns of polarization
in Congress. I use Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) DW-NOMINATE scores, which
are constructed from members’ roll call voting records, to measure members’ gen-
eral liberal-conservative position in the 107th and 109th Congresses.3 The DW-
NOMINATE scores of legislators’ ideological positions range from -1 (most liberal)
to 1 (most conservative). I am primarily interested in examining why legislators move
outward toward the ideological extremes (or not), so I use folded DW-NOMINATE
scores throughout the analysis that indicate members’ ideological extremity
rather than their liberalism or conservatism. I created the folded DW-NOMINATE
scores by taking the absolute value of each members’ original score since zero serves
as the ideological midpoint. The folded DW-NOMINATE scores I use throughout
the analyses range from 0 to 1.4 Higher scores indicate greater ideological extremism
in either the liberal or conservative direction.
2.4.1 Measuring Candidates’ Reliance on Large Individual Contributions
The independent variables are fundraising and voter-based explanations for can-
didates’ ideological position and thus incumbents’ ideological extremity. The main
independent variables of interest in this study are the fundraising variables. Data on
each members’ campaign fundraising during the previous electoral cycle was collected
from the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) Candidate Financial Summaries files.
I used the candidate summary files from the 1999-2000 election cycle for members
3The analysis uses data from the 107th and 109th Congresses because I am limited to years
that can be paired with district level data on voters collected from the 2000 and 2004 National
Annenberg Election Survey.
4Each member’s average DW-NOMINATE score is constrained to lie between -1 and 1 when the
scores are constructed. For a single Congress, however, some legislators may (and do for the data
I use in this analysis) have scores that are outside this range.
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serving in the 107th Congress and data from the 2003-2004 election cycle for members
in the 109th Congress.
The importance of high dollar donors to candidates’ ideological positioning during
the election and their subsequent voting record in Congress should depend on how
important contributions from these individuals are to the candidates’ fundraising
efforts. Some candidates may rely heavily on high dollar donors relative to other
individuals who contribute to their campaign. Others may rely on high dollars donors
as an important source of their campaign funds relative to all other possible sources
of campaign funds and for some candidates, high dollar donors may represent a
substantial portion of their funds raised from individuals and their overall fundraising
totals. For this reason, I use two separate fundraising measures in the analyses:
the percentage of the candidates’ campaign funds from individuals (as opposed to
donations from political action committees or party organizations) that came from
high dollar donors and the percentage of the candidates’ total campaign funds that
came from these individuals. Both variables were constructed using data from the
FEC’s candidate summary files.
What constitutes a high dollar donor? During the 2000 election cycle, the limit on
individual contributions to a candidate was $1000 per election or $2000 for the typical
candidate’s election cycle that includes a primary and general election.5 Between
the 2000 and 2004 election cycles, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 was
passed. It raised the limit on individual contributions to $2000 per election or $4000
total for candidates who run in both the primary and general elections. The FEC
data reports individual donations to candidates in several increments: $200-$499,
$500-$749, and $750 and up. Since it is the top increment reported by the FEC, I
5The limits on individual contributions are per election limits. Each election (primary, runoff
and general) within the same cycle counts as a separate election.
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classify all donors who gave at least $750 to a candidate as high dollar donors. The
average winning House candidate in each district receives donations of this amount
and higher from over 200 individuals.
Tapping into these high dollar donations is an important part of many candidates’
fundraising strategies. The breakdown of where successful candidates’—those who
actually win the race for a House seat and are included in this data set—money
comes from is shown in Figure 2.1. The typical successful candidate in the 2000
and 2004 election cycles receives over half their total campaign funds (53%) from
individual donors and half the money raised from individual donors comes in the
form of donations that exceed $750. In other words, the money raised by high dollar
donors typically constitutes just over a quarter of all the money candidates raise
in an election cycle. Although campaign finance research has focused much of its
attention on PAC contributions, individual donations in amounts of at least $750 are
also an important source of money for candidates.
I created two separate measures of the importance of high dollar donors to mem-
bers. The first is the total dollar amount each member received in individ-
ual contributions of at least $750 as a percentage of the total amount the
member received in individual contributions (of any size). This measure is an
indication of how much members rely on these large individual contributions relative
to smaller individual contributions. The measure distinguishes between those who
raise $10,000 from 10 individuals contributing $1000 each and those that raise the
same total amount from individuals ($10,000) but in the form of $20 donations from
500 individuals. The response of members to individual donors’ preferences may be
different depending on what scenario best characterizes their campaign’s fundraising
strategy. The second measure is the total dollar amount each member received
in individual contributions of at least $750 as a percentage of the total
16
Figure 2.1: Sources of Campaign Funds, 2000 and 2004 Election Cycles
!"#$%
&'(%
)*+,-,+./0%
#1*23,4.51*$%
06$$%27/*%89:'%
;9(%
)*+,-,+./0%
#1*23,4.51*$%
<36/263%27/*%
89:'%
;=(%
>2763%
9(%
amount of campaign funds the member received from any source, includ-
ing PACs, party committees, and the candidates’ personal contributions to their own
campaign. This measure accounts for the members’ reliance on high dollar donations
relative to all the other sources they could turn to for campaign funds. My theory
predicts that these donations will impact Republican and Democratic members dif-
ferently, so I also include a dummy variable for the members’ party affiliation (coded
1 if Democratic and 0 if Republican) to allow and test for this effect.
Democratic and Republican members of Congress both raise a similar amount
of money from these big donors. Figure 2.2 displays the distributions of these vari-
ables, broken down by party. The means of both variables (money from high dollar
donors as a percentage of all money raised from individuals and money from these
donors as a percentage of the total amount raised from all sources) are markedly
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Figure 2.2: Campaign Contributions from High Dollar Donors by Party, 2000 and
2004 Election Cycles
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similar. Contributions in amounts of at least $750 account for roughly half of the to-
tal dollar amount the average member in either party raises from individual donors.
These large individual contributions also account for roughly a quarter of the average
member’s total funds for that election cycle, regardless of their party affiliation. The
primary difference between successful Democratic and Republican members is that
the variation in where Democrats’ campaign money comes from is greater, though
not by a meaningful amount.
Members at the two extremes of their reliance on high dollar donors are listed
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in Table 2.1. This table lists the top ten Democrats and Republicans in the data
who received the highest and lowest percentage of their overall funds in individual
contributions of at least $750.6 Although the average successful candidates in each
party seem to share similar fundraising strategies, or at the very least attract a
similar amount of their campaign funds from high dollar donors, there appears to be
considerable variation in how much members rely on large individual contributions
as an important funding source for their campaign.
Some of this variation among members undoubtably results from idiosyncratic
factors, such as a candidate’s personal tolerance and taste for raising campaign funds
from individual donors. Making high-dollar individual donors an important aspect
of congressional campaign fundraising activity is not simply a matter of personal
preference, however; certain types of congressional districts appear to increase the
likelihood or ease of tapping into high-dollar donors. Successful House candidates
who are among the most reliant on this group of donors run in districts that are more
likely to be wealthy, urban, and partisan (see Figure 2.3). Although these straightfor-
ward descriptive analyses do not directly address why candidates in wealthy, urban,
partisan districts choose to pursue this fundraising strategy, the patterns do sug-
gest that easy access to a network of high dollar donors is a factor in their decision
calculus. Research on donors to congressional campaigns suggest these donors are
clustered in a small number of zipcodes across the country, located in places like
Orange County, CA, Greenwich, CT, and neighborhoods bordering Washington, DC
(Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2008). Although approximately 3 out of every
5 itemized campaign contributions from individual donors come from outside the
6That most members received a higher percentage of their total campaign funds from high dollar
donors in the 2003-2004 election cycle than the 1999-2000 election cycle is readily apparent from
Table 2.1. Although this data does not directly speak to why this pattern exists, it is most likely
due to higher limits on individual contributions established by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 just prior to the 2004 cycle.
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Figure 2.3: District Characteristics and Members’ Dependence on High-Dollar
Donors Relative to Smaller Individual Donations
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district (Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2008), congressional candidates who
live close to these locations will have an easier time identifying with, spending time
with, and otherwise building relationships with big donors.
2.4.2 Additional Explanatory Variables
District characteristics, such as the ideology and partisanship of voters in the
district, should also impact whether members adopt more or less extreme ideolog-
ical positions. Candidates respond to the ideological and partisan composition of
their district. Previous work has frequently used the two party presidential vote in
each district to capture the political preferences of voters in the district (see, e.g.,
Ansolabehere et al. 2001). I construct measures of voter preferences in each dis-
trict using the 2000 and 2004 NAES. The NAES data are cross-sectional polls of the
American electorate that were conducted throughout the 2000 and 2004 presiden-
tial campaigns. The NAES contains large enough samples of the voting population
that I can construct more direct district level measures of voter preferences, with
the exception of congressional districts in Hawaii and Alaska because the survey was
not conducted in those states. The sample sizes in the NAES allow me to create
survey-based measures of voter preferences in each district (Clinton 2006).
The first of these measures is the ideology of the mean voter in each district.
This measure represents the mean ideology of the general electorate in each
district, or in other words, the geographic constituency each candidate represents.7 I
construct this variable using respondents’ self-reported ideology. Respondents were
asked to place themselves along a five point ideology scale, ranging from very con-
7Spatial theories focus on the importance of the median voter, however, using the ideology of
the median voter does not provide meaningful variation between the districts. Because the ideology
variable in the survey is a five point scale, the median voter in virtually every district would be
located at the same point. For the purposes of this study, the ideology of each district’s mean voter
is more substantively interesting.
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servative (1) to very liberal (5). For districts that elected a Democratic member, the
general electorate ideology is the mean ideology in the district for respondents who
voted (or intended to vote) in the general election. I recoded the ideology variable
in districts that elected a Republican so that the values were reversed and ranged
from very liberal (1) to very conservative (5). I then took the mean ideology for
these districts’ respondents as well. In both cases, higher values represent more ide-
ologically extreme districts (greater conservatism in Republican represented districts
and greater liberalism in Democrat represented districts). Members elected in dis-
tricts with a more extreme general electorate should themselves be more ideologically
extreme if their ideological position reflects their geographic constituency.
I also used the 2000 and 2004 NAES to construct a measure of district partisan-
ship. This measure captures the partisan composition of the district by measuring
the size of the partisan base in each district. The NAES includes a basic partisanship
survey question that asks respondents whether they consider themselves a Repub-
lican, a Democrat or an independent. In districts that elected a Republican, the
partisan base measure was constructed by taking the percentage of respondents in
the district that self-identified as Republicans.8 For Democratic districts, the parti-
san base in the district is the percentage of respondents in the district that identify
themselves as a Democrat. Candidates running in a district with a larger partisan
base should be more extreme because they face less competition from the opposing
party.
One of the tradeoffs candidates face is whether to position themselves to appeal to
their core voters to win their party’s nomination or moderate to win more votes in the
8Butler (2009) constructs two separate measures of the partisan base using the NAES data and
finds that both measures lead to the same substantive results. The first measure includes only
strong party identifiers and the second includes all party identifiers (i.e., both strong and weak
identifiers). This analysis only includes strong party identifiers in the measure of the partisan base.
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general election (Adams and Merrill 2008; Burden 2004). Accounting for this tradeoff
is also important because the growing ideological extremism of party activists, a
subset that has considerable overlap with primary voters, is one explanation for
polarization (Theriault 2008). I construct the variable measuring the ideology of
the primary electorate in the same manner as the general electorate ideology
variable. Using the same five point ideology scale, I calculated the mean ideology
of respondents in each district who voted in or intended to vote in the winning
party’s primary election. Republican primary voters were used to construct the
measure for districts where a Republican won and Democratic primary voters were
used in Democratic districts. The ideology scale was recoded in the same way as
with the general electorate measure, so that higher values indicate greater primary
extremism. More extreme primary voters should pull successful candidates away
from the ideological middle.
The last variable I include is the winning candidate’s vote share in the elec-
tion. There is some disagreement in the literature about whether safe districts cause
more candidate divergence and more extreme members (Ansolabehere et al. 2001;
Fiorina 1974; Ladewig 2010; Mayhew 1974). It is included here because, although
the direction of the effect is somewhat uncertain, many studies find that incumbents’
electoral safety affects their ideological position. This variable was obtained from the
2002 and 2006 Almanacs of American Politics. The candidates’ electoral safety was
constructed using their vote share in the relevant general election (i.e., the 2000
vote share for candidates serving in the 107th Congress and the 2004 vote share for
candidates who served in the 109th). The descriptive statistics for all variables are
displayed in Table 2.2.
I estimated an ordinary least squares (OLS) model to test the influence of high
dollar donors on members’ ideological extremity as evidenced by their roll call vot-
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Ideological Extremism 0.46 0.17 0.04 1.18
Partisan Base 0.36 0.08 0.13 0.68
General Electorate Extremism 3.11 0.27 2.43 3.75
Primary Electorate Extremism 3.46 0.32 2.52 4.13
Vote Margin 0.69 0.13 .46 .99
High Dollar Donations (% individual) 0.47 .18 0 .92
High Dollar Donations (% total) 0.24 0.13 0 0.75
ing behavior. The dependent variable in all the models is the measure of members’
ideological extremity. Recall that higher values indicate more extreme roll call vot-
ing records. The main independent variables of interest are the measures of large
individual contributions to the candidates as a percentage of their total individual
contributions and their overall campaign funds from all sources.
2.5 Results
The key tests of my hypotheses are presented in Table 2.3. The first column of
regression results contains the estimates from the first model, which uses the contri-
butions variable that measures the reliance on high dollar donors as a percentage of
funds raised from individual donors. The second column contains the estimates from
the model that uses the measure of the total amount from high dollar donors as a
percentage of total funds raised. The critical test of the hypothesis is the interaction
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between the members’ party and their reliance on high dollar donors. While I ex-
pect that Democrats who receive a larger portion of their campaign funds from high
dollar donors will respond to these individuals by moderating their roll call voting
behavior, I anticipate that greater reliance on high dollar donors will pull Republican
members toward the ideological extremes.
Table 2.3: The Impact of High Dollar Donations on Ideological Positioning
Variable Individuals Only All Sources
Partisan Base 0.445* 0.415*
(0.073) (0.073)
General Electorate Extremism 0.114* 0.124*
(0.032) (0.032)
Primary Electorate Extremism 0.136* 0.141*
(0.026) (0.026)
Vote Margin 0.061 0.058
(0.040) (0.040)
High Dollar Donations 0.072
(as % of donations from individuals) (0.051)
High Dollar Donations 0.188*
(as % of total funds) (0.069)
Democrat 0.004 0.007
(0.032) (0.025)
Donations*Democrat -0.182* -0.333*
(0.061) (0.082)
Constant -0.560* -0.610*
(0.087) (0.087)
N 826 826
R-squared 0.43 0.44
Note: Coefficients are OLS estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* indicates p≤ .05, two-tailed tests.
Regardless of whether the importance of large individual contributions is mea-
sured relative to other individual contributions or relative to the total amount of
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campaign funds a member raises in that electoral cycle, both models show that high
dollars donors moderate the voting behavior of Democratic members. Democratic
members of the House with greater reliance on these big donors as a source of cam-
paign funds adopt less extreme ideological positions. When Democratic members
receive an additional twenty percent of their individual contributions from these
high dollar donors (roughly a one standard deviation shift), they moderate their vot-
ing behavior by .02 on the 0 to 1 ideological extremity scale than would otherwise
be expected given their district’s characteristics. Democrats’ response to these do-
nations is statistically different from Republican members but Republicans do not
have the opposite response. Raising a larger amount of money from large individual
contributions instead of individual contributions in smaller amounts does not alter
the behavior of Republican members. Their voting behavior is primarily a function
of their district characteristics; high dollar donors do not seem to exert an indepen-
dent effect on their behavior, at least not when considering their importance relative
to other individual contributions.
The differential impact of high dollar donors on members’ voting behavior is
even more stark when the importance of these donations is measured relative to all
other possible sources of campaign funds. In the second model, receiving a greater
percentage of money from large individual contributions once again has a different
impact on Republicans and Democrats, as expected. When the importance of high
dollar donors relative to all other sources of campaign money is considered, however,
these donations do affect push Democrats and Republicans in opposite directions; in
response, Democrats become more moderate and Republicans become more extreme.
Increasing the percentage of these contributions by fifteen percent (again, about a one
standard deviation shift) moderates Democrats roll call voting behavior by roughly
the same amount as before (0.02) but has a greater substantive effect on Republican
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members, causing them to be almost 0.03 points more extreme. These effects may
seem small, but the impact of receiving money from large individual contributions is
much larger when considering this variable’s full range of values.
Table 2.4: Fitted Values for Model with Large Individual Contributions as a Per-
centage of Overall Campaign Funds (Dependent Variable = Ideological Extremity)
Republicans Democrats
% of total funds = 0 0.45 0.46
[0.41, 0.49] [0.43, 0.49]
% of total funds = 0.24 0.50 0.42
[0.48, 0.52] [0.41, 0.44]
% of total funds = 0.75 0.59 0.35
[0.53, 0.67] [0.30, 0.40]
Note: 95% confidence intervals are in brackets.
Table 2.4 contains the fitted value of ideological extremity for Republican and
Democratic members of Congress across varying levels of reliance on high dollar
donors. While holding all the other variables at their mean or modal value (depend-
ing on whether the variable was continuous or binary), I allow the amount members
received from large individual contributions as a percentage of their total funds to
change from the minimum value (0) to the mean (0.24) to the maximum (0.75). The
same asymmetry that was apparent in the earlier results is also clear in Table 2.4.
When the average Republican member’s reliance on large individual contributions
increases from zero percent of their total funds to three quarters, their ideological
extremity increases by almost 0.15. Their rightward movement in response to high
dollar donors becoming an important source of their campaign funding is substan-
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tively meaningful, causing Republican members to move almost an entire standard
deviation to the ideological extremes. The impact of relying on high dollar donors
causes slightly less dramatic ideological movement among Democratic members but
still moderates their voting behavior by just over one tenth of a point. The Demo-
cratic response is substantively significant when you consider that the Democratic
party mean has moved roughly 0.15 the same scale in the last fifty years, during a
period with large increases in partisan polarization.
The other variables also have the anticipated effect on ideological movement. Dis-
trict partisanship and ideology both influence how ideologically extreme candidates
are once elected to the House. When the size of the partisan base in the district
increases, members in both parties respond by becoming more extreme. These re-
sults suggest that members elected in districts that are either safely Democratic or
Republican have more support (or pressure) to become a solid liberal or conserva-
tive in the House. Members in swing districts that are more closely divided along
party lines moderate their voting behavior, perhaps to avoid alienating voters that
are not in the partisan base but whose votes members still need to get reelected in
close districts. District ideology unsurprisingly has a similar impact on members’
ideology extremity. Members’ voting behavior reflects the ideological extremity of
their district; members from conservative and liberal districts are more extreme than
members elected by more centrist districts.
In addition to their geographical constituency, members also consider the political
preferences of primary voters, a subset of voters that is particularly important to their
election prospects. In fact, the coefficients in both models indicate that members
are actually more responsive to their primary electorate than the broader general
electorate in their district. This finding lends additional evidence to existing research
on partisan polarization in Congress that points to primary voters and party activists
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as groups that have grown more extreme and pushed Democrats and Republicans to
the left and right, respectively. Once these district characteristics are accounted for,
which in many ways capture how safe the district is for Republican or Democratic
members, members’ vote margin does not have a separate statistically significant
effect on their ideological placement.
These results point to a connection between the source of members’ campaign
funds and their ideology. A lingering question, however, is whether money from
these big donors is simply flowing to members who already reflect their political
preferences. In other words, is relying on large individual contributions for campaign
funds actually altering members’ ideological placement or a result of it? I examine
the impact of high dollar donors on newly elected members of Congress to help
untangle the direction of the causal arrow.
When new candidates emerge and run for the U.S. House, there is usually some
information about where they lie along the left-right spectrum. Candidates who are
competitive in an open seat race or as a challenger typically have some electoral
experience. Their prior electoral experience, in their state legislature for instance,
does not send a particularly strong signal to potential donors about their political
preferences. For instance, there may be little overlap between the policy issues the
state legislature and Congress handle. Candidates who have previous served in po-
litical office may also have a limited voting record for donors to use when they decide
whether to contribute money to that candidate. While candidates obviously make
campaign promises and spend time discussing their political preferences with voters
and potential donors, these promises are not as credible as the proven voting records
members of Congress have. Since it is unlikely that high dollar donors contribute
to challengers and candidates in open seat races because they are certain those can-
didates already have political preferences that match their own, if an association
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between these donations and voting behavior exists, it provides more evidence that
reliance on high dollar donors alters members’ ideological placement.
The results from the analysis of freshmen members of Congress are presented
in Table 2.5. All the variables are the same as in the previous models. The only
difference is that this analysis only includes freshmen members of Congress, a subset
of the larger sample of all members of the 107th and 109th Congresses. These models
provide additional support for the theoretical expectation that high dollar donors
have a distinct set of political preferences from other important constituencies, such
as the geographic constituency or primary voters. Even more important, members
appear to respond to these donors’ preferences, even when they pull them away
from their district, because winning these donors’ support and their contributions
is important for members who rely on them to fund a substantial portion of their
campaign.
As in the models for the full sample, Republicans’ ideological position is not
dependent on what percentage of their total individual contributions are in amounts
of at least $750.9 Newly elected Democrats, however, who receive a greater share of
their individual contributions from in amounts of $750 or more are constrained by
these donors and moderate their voting behavior. When the percentage a freshmen
Democrat receives from high dollars donors increases by fifteen percent,10 they are
0.04 points more moderate on the 0 to 1 left-right scale. This effect is twice the
magnitude of a similar one standard deviation increase in this variable in the model
of all members’ voting behavior. Although this hypothesis is not directly tested in
this study, freshmen members may be unusually responsive to high dollar donors for
9At the .05 level, high dollar donors have no impact on Republican members. At the .10 level,
however, Republicans who receive a larger share of individual contributions come from these donors
are more ideologically extreme.
10This increase represents a one standard deviation shift in this variable for the restricted data
set that contains only freshman members.
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Table 2.5: The Impact of High Dollar Donations on Ideological Positioning for Non-
Incumbents
Variable Individuals Only All Sources
Partisan Base 0.615* 0.564*
(0.221) (0.230)
General Electorate Extremism 0.047 0.043
(0.117) (0.132)
Primary Electorate Extremism 0.225* 0.250*
(0.084) (0.086)
Vote Margin 0.252 0.252
(0.145) (0.150)
High Dollar Donations 0.238
(as % of donations from individuals) (0.153)
High Dollar Donations 0.250
(as % of total funds) (0.220)
Democrat 0.082 0.016
(0.092) (0.081)
Donations*Democrat -0.495* -0.563
(0.235) (0.376)
Constant -0.827* -0.836*
(0.283) (0.296)
N 77 77
N Dem 26
N GOP 51
R-squared 0.62 0.61
Note: Coefficients are OLS estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* indicates p≤ .05, two-tailed tests.
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two reasons: (1) their ideological movement is less constrained because they do not
have existing vote records and ideological reputations, and (2) their relative lack of
electoral safety may make them especially responsive to individuals who can help
them build a large war chest.
The asymmetric impact of these donations on Democrats and Republicans is only
apparent in the models that measure large individual contributions as a percentage
of the total amounts given by individual donors. The model with the second measure
of these contributions shows that a greater reliance on large individual contributions
does not impact either Democratic or Republican members after controlling for the
characteristics of their district.11 The partisan and ideological composition of the
district also have the expected effects in this model as well, although the general
electorate does not have a statistically significant impact on freshmen members’
voting behavior. Both the size of the partisan base and the ideological extremity
of the primary electorate have a positive relationship with the members’ ideological
extremity as expected.
2.6 Conclusion
These results suggest that when members look towards high dollar donors for a
substantial portion of their campaign funds, their reliance on this group alters their
voting behavior in Congress, even after controlling for important district character-
istics that are known to affect members’ ideological placement. In particular, re-
ceiving a larger share of campaign donations from these big donors pulls Democratic
members towards the center and pushes Republicans to more extreme positions than
expected given their district’s electoral landscape. The impact of donors on their ide-
ological positions is even more pronounced among freshmen Democrats in Congress,
11It is likely this result is partially a function of the small sample sizes when examining the voting
behavior of a small subset like freshmen members.
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which suggests that more junior legislators are particularly responsive.
Although the impact of individual big donors on the parties’ roll-call voting be-
havior over time is not directly tested in this study, these results have important
implications for the asymmetric polarization observed in Congress over the past
few decades. Party polarization in Congress is the aggregate result of individual
reelection-seeking members pursuing their own goals. As congressional campaigns
become more costly, members face more pressure to raise campaign funds. Not all
members respond to these pressures with the same campaign fundraising strategy,
but for members who count on the support of individual big donors there are incen-
tives to respond to donors’ potentially unique set of policy preferences. The relative
ideological moderation of Democratic members who rely on big donors suggests re-
sponding to this elite group of voters may be constraining the ideological extremism
of individual Democratic members, which would create the aggregate polarization
pattern we see—Republicans have moved sharply to the right while Democrats have
drifted more slowly leftward.
The evidence on the link between big donors and Republicans’ ideological place-
ment is a bit more mixed. While some models suggest Republican members with
greater financial support from big donors are more extreme, other models suggest
donors do not have an independent effect on Republican members. One potential
explanation is that high dollar donors who contribute to Republican candidates may
have similar policy preferences as the Republican party base. If donors do not have
distinctive preferences from the other electoral constituencies individual members re-
spond to, donors should reinforce where Republicans would choose to position them-
selves based on their district, primary constituency, and other factors rather than
creating incentives for members to diverge from their expected ideological placement.
That Democratic members who rely on big donors are systematically pulled towards
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the ideological middle suggests the preferences of campaign donors are in fact distinct
from Democratic members’ districts, partisan base, and primary electorates.
In addition to demonstrating the impact of campaign donors on ideological po-
sitioning and providing a potential explanation for asymmetric polarization, these
results also raise questions about the impact of donors on dyadic representation.
The relationship between members and their districts is reinforced by the electoral
connection. Members of Congress have incentives to align themselves with their dis-
trict to win votes; however, this study suggests the campaign for resources and the
incentives it generates to respond to donors may also impact members’ congressional
behavior, particularly their roll-call votes. Because a significant portion of individual
donors who make large campaign contributions do not reside in members’ districts,
these findings suggest the impact of donors on members’ representation of their home
district should be further explored.
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3. BIG DONORS AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICY PROPOSALS
3.1 Introduction
Members of Congress face a relatively small set of choices by the time a bill
reaches the floor for a roll call vote. Nearly all members vote on each bill and
roll call votes are typically up or down votes on a bill whose content has already
been determined. In contrast, members have much greater discretion over other
aspects of their legislative behavior such as bill sponsorship and committee work.
This discretion allows members to tailor their legislative activity to their electoral,
policy, and institutional goals, but also raises complex tradeoffs. In the context of
bill sponsorship, they must decide how many bills to sponsor, what policy issues
to address, and what policy solutions to propose. The electoral connection ensures
the choices members of Congress make at this stage will likely be influenced by
constituency preferences and priorities, but it is less clear how and when the interests
of specific subconstituency groups matter. This paper focuses on the impact one
small but particularly important subconstituency, big donors, has on the types of
bills members introduce, and more specifically, on the policy solutions they tend to
propose.
Research on bill sponsorship primarily focuses on the number of bills members
introduce and their attention to different policy issues, however, much of the time-
intensive legislative work goes into determining the policy design of each bill and
drafting the corresponding legislative language. One of the most fundamental con-
tent decisions members make is how to solve the policy problem, particularly what
policy tool to use. Policy tools are the specific mechanisms legislators use to achieve
their policy objectives. Direct government spending is the most common policy tool
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members of Congress use, and the most frequently studied by political scientists,
but direct government spending is only one form government action can take. For
example, policymakers can also address policy problems by altering the tax code,
subsidizing private lenders, or introducing new regulations. These alternative policy
instruments are considered indirect policy tools. Unlike direct spending, indirect
policy tools typically deliver policy benefits through more market-based mechanisms
such as the tax system and private lenders (Salamon 2002).
To some extent, policy tools can simply be considered different means to an
end. Many social problems the government tries to solve such as increasing home
ownership rates can be tackled in multiple ways. For example, the government
can subsidize home ownership directly through a government spending program or
indirectly through tax expenditures like the existing Home Mortgage Interest De-
duction. Though both policies address a similar public problem—they make home
ownership more affordable—research suggests the tools policymakers choose matter
because they impact outcomes. Direct government spending typically increases the
role of the public sector relative to the private sector, redistributes downward from
wealthier to poorer voters, and increases the public’s awareness of government policy
interventions (Howard 1997, 2007; Hacker 2002; Mettler 2011).
Indirect tools such as tax expenditures and loan guarantees tend to have the
opposite effect. They rely heavily on the private sector to sort out public policy
problems and deliver social benefits. The role of government in indirect policies is
limited to restructuring market incentives to encourage the private provision and
consumption of benefits. Because social benefits are not delivered directly to indi-
viduals through a government program, the government has less control over how
many and when these benefits are provided. Indirect tools also tend to provide larger
benefits to higher-income voters (Howard 2007; Burman, Toder, and Geissler 2008;
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Toder and Baneman 2012) and decrease the visibility of and support for government
social policy (Hacker 2002; Mettler 2011). Recent research shows that voters also
perceive direct and indirect spending as ideologically distinct policy approaches and
vary their response to Congress’ policy output accordingly (Ellis and Faricy 2011).
Given the broad range of policy instruments members of Congress can choose
from, how do members decide which approach to take? Previous research suggests
members’ policy tool choices are motivated in part by ideology—conservatives pre-
fer indirect policy mechanisms and liberals prefer direct government spending. This
study argues that donors also influence the policy designs members of Congress pro-
pose. Members of Congress use bill sponsorship to communicate their priorities and
preferences to their constituents and influence the legislative agenda. The pressure
to continually raise campaign money from supporters combined with the typical
voter’s relatively low attentiveness to the bill sponsorship stage creates incentives for
members of Congress to represent the interests of their donors at this stage. These
incentives motivate members to sponsor bills that fit with big donors’ perspective of
how and when government should intervene to deliver social and economic benefits.
3.2 Literature Review
Like other aspects of congressional behavior, members’ bill sponsorship is influ-
enced by constituency demands. Introducing a new bill is costly both in terms of
staff resources and opportunity costs. It requires time and resources to draft a bill
and build support for its passage, which encourages members to carefully choose the
legislative issues they work on and the bills they introduce (Hall 1996; Wawro 2000).
Members’ primary goal of reelection incentivizes them to allocate their limited time
and resources to bills with a large electoral payoff. Members of Congress increase
their electoral support by focusing on introducing bills that demonstrate they care
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about the same policy issues as their constituents and share their policy preferences.
Sponsoring bills that reflect voters’ priorities is one form of legislative responsive-
ness. In the aggregate, the issues on the legislative agenda track closely over time
with the problems the public thinks are most pressing (Jones and Baumgartner 2004,
2005). At the micro-level, individual members are also active on policy issues that
align with their constituents’ interests. Members of Congress use bill sponsorship
to communicate their legislative priorities to constituents and place policy issues
their constituents value on the legislative agenda. Because members can choose from
a nearly infinite set of issues to act on, the limited set of bills they do introduce
send clear signals about the intensity of their preferences (Rocca and Gordon 2010).
Introducing a higher number of bills in certain policy areas is one way members
communicate that their priorities align with their constituents’. Previous studies of
bill sponsorship find that the number of bills members of Congress introduce on spe-
cific policy issues such as agriculture and health depends on their district’s relative
income, racial composition, the relevant industries’ role in the local economy and
other district demographics (Highton and Rocca 2005; Woon 2009; Hayes, Hibbing,
and Sulkin 2010). Members also use bill sponsorship to develop stronger reputations
in areas of perceived electoral weakness. Members of Congress often introduce bills
on issues raised by their challengers to enhance their electoral prospects in the next
election cycle (Sulkin 2005).
Just as the types of bills members sponsor is motivated by their electoral goals,
so too is the ideological content of the bills they introduce. Along with congres-
sional activities like floor speeches, press releases, and cosponsorship, sponsoring
bills is an opportunity for position-taking (Mayhew 1974). Reelection-seeking mem-
bers of Congress introduce bills that allow them to demonstrate they share their
constituents’ ideological preferences. Though the empirical literature has predomi-
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nantly focused on the constituency determinants of issue attention rather than the
ideological content of bills, Highton and Rocca (2005) show that the ideological di-
rection of members’ bills aligns with district opinion on salient policy issues such as
abortion.
3.3 Theory
Prior research shows that electoral considerations are an important predictor of
the bills members of Congress introduce. Their reelection goal motivates them to
shape their sponsorship activity so it reflects the policy priorities and preferences
of their constituents. This study builds on previous research by demonstrating that
policymakers’ electoral motives also drive them to represent donor interests at the
bill sponsorship stage. While campaign donors, particularly the individual big donors
this study focuses on, compose a small share of members’ electoral coalitions, their
financial support is essential to many members’ reelection efforts and likely to affect
how members allocate their limited time and resources at the bill sponsorship stage.
In particular, members who receive greater support from big donors and want to
retain their financial support in the next election cycle will be motivated to sponsor
bills that reflect donors’ legislative priorities and approach solving public problems
from a similar perspective.
Members of Congress have clear financial incentives to respond to donors at the
bill sponsorship stage. Research on the connections between bill sponsorship and
campaign contributions is limited, but suggests bill sponsorship can have a financial
payoff for members. Both the positions members take in the bills they sponsor (Rocca
and Gordon 2010) and how effectively they guide their bills through the legislative
process (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999) lead to increased donations from polit-
ical action committees. Though this study focuses on individual big donors rather
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than political action committees, these studies support the notion that donors are
aware of and respond to members’ bill sponsorship. This responsiveness creates an
incentive for members to incorporate donors’ preferences into the bills they introduce
to expand and retain the support of their campaign donors.
The early stages of the legislative process may also be an ideal place for mem-
bers of Congress to respond to high dollar donors for another reason: low visibility.
While previous research suggests political elites such as donors are aware of the bills
members introduce, the average voter is likely less attentive to bill sponsorship than
later stages of the legislative process such as roll call voting. Roll call voting behavior
is largely dictated by constituency preferences and party (Clinton 2006; Snyder and
Groseclose 2000; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2001), however, the lower visibility
and greater discretion members have during bill sponsorship enables a greater range
of influences to impact members’ sponsorship decisions. It also makes responding to
a narrow constituency whose preferences may conflict with district constituents and
party leaders less risky.
If members of Congress respond to big donors’ preferences (or their perceptions
of donors’ preferences), how would donors be expected to influence the types of
policies members do and do not place on the legislative agenda? I argue that donors
influence the types of policy solutions members prioritize. In general, donors and the
larger group of wealthy individuals they are typically a part of (Verba, Scholzman,
and Brady 1995; Francia et al. 2003; Francia et al. 2005) should be less likely to
favor direct government intervention to address social welfare issues irrespective of
their partisanship and issue priorities. Studying the preferences of donors and other
aﬄuent voters is notoriously challenging because they are by definition an elite group,
but empirical studies suggest their perspective may differ from the typical voter in
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ways that correspond with preferences for specific policy tools.1
Very aﬄuent voters, a subset which individuals capable of making high dollar
contributions to candidates are likely to be members of, typically express more con-
servative opinions about the proper role of the federal government and have a distinct
set of policy preferences across several major policy areas including social welfare and
free trade (Page, Bartels, and Seawright 2013; Gilens 2012). For instance, wealthy
voters identify economic inequality and unemployment as important policy prob-
lems at similar rates as the mass public, but they are disproportionately opposed
to government action to either reduce inequality or create jobs (Page, Bartels, and
Seawright 2013). This finding suggests donors may prioritize similar policy issues
as the general electorate2 but have different views on the appropriate solution. In
particular, the Page, Bartels, and Seawright (2013) study suggests the very wealthy
have a greater aversion to direct government intervention in the economy. A study of
donor districts and the big donors living in them offers further support for this view
of donor preferences, characterizing donors as libertarian-cosmopolitan as opposed
to populist-moralistics (Bramlett, Gimpel, and Lee 2011).
1Empirical research on the policy attitudes of big donors is limited. Big donors who often
contribute thousands of dollars to candidates and parties during a single election cycle are an
elite group of individuals. While nationally representative surveys can offer some insights into the
policy preferences of this distinct group, the sample of big donors in any given survey is typically
too small to be representative. (Though unrelated to this particular study, little is known about
the policy preferences of the very poor for similar reasons. Estimating opinion at both tails of
the income distribution is difficult.) In addition, identifying the most aﬄuent big donors is often
difficult or impossible because top coding income is the norm in surveys. For instance, the National
Annenberg Election Survey combines all respondents with a pre-tax household income of more than
$150,000 into a single income category. A collaborative effort between a large group of academics
and NORC at the University of Chicago is currently working on developing and conducting a
national survey of the very aﬄuent, but so far preliminary evidence is only available from a pilot
study conducted in the greater Chicago area. The current evidence on the preferences of the very
wealthy and donors suggests they have distinct policy opinions with implications for their policy
tool preferences, but more research on their opinions needs to be conducted before their policy
perspective can be described with greater specificity.
2Though the survey also reveals that Americans in the wealthiest 1 percent attach a much greater
importance to some policy problems, especially deficit reduction.
42
Although the exact mechanism through which donors form these preferences is
unclear and beyond the scope of this analysis, one possibility is that the donors’
personal interactions with the economy produce certain biases in their policy prefer-
ences. Political science research generally finds preferences for social welfare policies
are driven by individuals’ partisanship and ideology; in most cases, their personal
economic experiences are not assumed to have a substantial impact on their policy
preferences. But a recent study shows that economic experiences can shape individ-
uals’ views toward government policy. Individuals with more economic worries and
less economic security are more likely to support government safety-net policies that
protect individuals against economic hardship (Hacker, Rehm, and Schlesinger 2013)
even after controlling for the usual factors thought to influence individuals’ public
opinion on these policy issues.
This finding suggests one pathway through which donors’ wealth and economic
successes could influence their opinions about how government should accomplish its
social policy objectives. Donors may be more likely to favor market-based solutions
because of their positive economic experiences. Their ability to make large contri-
butions to congressional campaigns indicates they have been unusually successful in
the private market, which may make them more likely than the typical voter to take
a dismal view of government’s ability to solve problems or the need for government
action. Instead, they may prefer that the federal government simply alter incentives
and let private actors provide the solution. It is also possible donors are less likely
to prefer direct policies because direct government spending tends to redistribute
downward, while indirect policies typically deliver greater benefits to the middle-
and upper-class. Thus, donors may prefer indirect over direct policy tools because
they are less likely to personally benefit from policies that deliver benefits through
direct channels.
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Regardless of how donors form these opinions, members’ perception of donors’
preferences for certain policy instruments should affect the types of policy solutions
members of Congress propose, but their response to these incentives should vary
depending on the extent to which they perceive individual big donors as critical to
their financial advantage in the next election. Members of Congress who received
a large share of their campaign funds from big donors during the last election have
stronger incentives to use their sponsorship activity to convey to donors that they
share a similar perspective. The source of their campaign funding during the previous
election is an important indicator of their fundraising strategy. If they relied heavily
on individual high dollar donors to fund their war chest during the last election cycle,
they are likely to continue pursuing their donations in future elections to help them
meet their fundraising goals. Maintaining good relationships with their existing
donors and other similar potential donors allows them to raise money efficiently
because they can continue reaching out to the same donor network for contributions
each election.
In sum, big donors should be less likely to favor direct government action and
more likely to favor market-based solutions to public problems. Their support for
particular approaches to solving policy problems does not necessarily mean they
share identical policy priorities and ideological goals, because the overlap between
policy tools, ideology, and policy goals is imperfect. The issues donors think are
important and that they want Congress to act on likely differ; however, on most
issues, they may share similar opinions on the relative utility of government and
private sector interventions. Members of Congress who rely on big donors to fund
their reelection campaign should respond to these preferences by altering the amount
of time and resources they devote to crafting bills that use direct and indirect policy
tools to advance their policy priorities. In particular, members of Congress with
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stronger financial ties to high dollar donors should sponsor fewer direct policy bills
and more indirect policy bills relative to what one would expect given their district
composition, institutional position, and ideology.
3.4 Data and Methods
Whether members of Congress prioritize indirect and direct policy mechanisms
is measured using data on bill introductions, which are coded based on the policy
mechanisms used in each bill. The dependent variables measure the number of direct
and indirect policy bills members introduce in each Congress. The bill sponsorship
data used in this study comes from the Congressional Bills Project.3 The Congres-
sional Bills Project contains data on the entire universe of public and private bills
members of Congress sponsor during a particular Congress, however this analysis
focuses solely on social policy and uses a subset of bills to test the hypotheses.
3.4.1 Determining Bill Content and Policy Mechanisms
First, the sample was restricted to social policy bills introduced in the 109th
(2005-2006) and 110th (2007-2008) Congresses. Following the broad topic codes in-
cluded in the congressional bills dataset, only bills in one of the following categories
were considered: Health, Labor and Employment, Education, Law, Crime, and Fam-
ily, Social Welfare, and Housing. These categories encompass a broad range of social
welfare policy issues. As shown in Figure 3.1, health policy bills are by far the most
common type of social policy bill introduced and make up 47 percent of all social
policy bills sponsored during the 109th and 110th Congresses. The focus on health
policy bills is unsurprising given the disproportionate impact of direct and indirect
health policy programs, such as Medicare and the employer-sponsored insurance tax
3The Congressional Bills Project is located at www.congressionalbills.org. The dataset, which
is maintained by E. Scott Adler and John Wilkerson, provides information about bills introduced
in the U.S. Congress during the period 1947-2008.
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exclusion, respectively, on the federal budget. After health care policy, education
policy gets the second largest amount of attention from lawmakers and makes up
one-quarter of the social policy category. The remaining policy topics, such as hous-
ing and traditional social welfare programs, receive less attention from members of
Congress, which again likely reflects their relative impact on the federal budget and
the shrinking amount of the budget dedicated to non-defense discretionary spending
as well as the narrower scope of these policy issues.
Figure 3.1: Social Policy Bills Introduced during the 109th and 110th Congresses,
by Topic
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The full set of social policy bills was further restricted to bills impacting either the
spending or revenue side of the federal ledger. In particular, the analysis is limited
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to bills involving direct government spending, tax expenditures, or loan guarantees.
Other forms of indirect policy, such as regulatory policy, were excluded from the
analysis because the research linking policy tools to outcomes primarily discusses
tax expenditures and loan guarantees. Each bill was then coded as using direct or
indirect policy tools. Some bills included multiple types of policy mechanisms (for
example, single bills proposing both direct spending and tax expenditures) and were
coded as including both tools.
Although policy mechanisms are associated with certain redistributive outcomes
on average, it is important to distinguish between the policy mechanisms members
choose to employ and their ideological objectives. While there is a relationship
between policy tools and objectives, the overlap is imperfect.4 This analysis, and
consequently the bill coding scheme, focuses solely on how members choose to pur-
sue their social policy goals and deliver social benefits, not the ideology of their
objectives. Tools and ideology are treated as distinct concepts in the literature (see
Howard 1997, 2007; Hacker 2002; Salamon 2002; Faricy 2011; Ellis and Faricy 2011;
Mettler 2011) and that convention is followed here; bills are coded as using indirect
or direct policy mechanisms irrespective of the social policy goal the member hopes
to accomplish.
Consider the following labor and employment bills introduced during the 110th
Congress. The first bill—the Online Job Training Act of 2008—was introduced by
4Prior work (Howard 1997, 2007; Hacker 2002; Faricy 2011) suggests a strong connection be-
tween members’ ideology and their approach to solving public policy problems. The market-based
approach associated with indirect policy tools increases this approach’s popularity among ideolog-
ical conservatives. Conversely, direct government programs are the preferred solutions of liberals.
Despite their similarities, policy tools and ideology are distinct concepts. For instance, policy tools
are a political outcome associated with ideology, but members’ ideological leanings are almost cer-
tainly causally prior. Ideology determines the type of policies members prefer and policy tools
determine the actual structure of how government action to solve the problem is carried out (Sala-
mon 2002). Policy tools and ideology also have distinct dimensions. Ideology is typically defined
in terms of the single dimension liberal-conservative scale. In contrast, policy tools are defined by
their degree of coercion, directness, automaticity and visibility (Salamon 2002; Mettler 2011).
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Representative Rush Holt, a Democrat representing the New Jersey 12th. This bill
proposes making grants to states for the implementation of workforce investment
programs that allow individuals to take online courses. Because the Online Job
Training Act proposes modifying direct government spending and delivering social
benefits through a new government program, this bill is coded as a direct bill. In
contrast, the Tax Incentives for Growth, Expansion and Revitalization Act of 2008
is coded as an indirect bill. The bill, sponsored by Democratic Representative Brian
Higgins (NY-27), proposes altering the tax code to allow employers to claim a tax
deduction for a portion of their income generated by conducting business activities
in a high-job loss region. Both bills are intended to increase labor force participation
and reduce unemployment; however, the first bill proposes altering direct government
spending to help states directly provide additional services to individuals, while the
second bill proposes creating tax incentives to encourage employers to operate in
geographical regions with high employment.
This coding approach is nuanced enough to test the hypotheses in this study, but
the approach has some limitations. The main limitation is that the coding scheme
accounts for the policy instrument each bill proposes, but does not take into account
the relative importance of each bill to the federal budget or public policy. Unlike
previous empirical studies of social policy tools (e.g., Faricy 2011), indirect and direct
bills that represent large public programs are treated the same as relatively small
public programs. While it would be ideal for Congress and the public to know the
budgetary impact of all bills, the Congressional Budget Office only prepares budget
estimates for a limited set of proposed policies and the Joint Committee on Taxation
only estimates the federal revenue impact of current law tax expenditures. These data
limitations make it impossible to account for the relative budgetary and substantive
importance of the bills members introduce.
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Following the coding scheme described above produces a sample of about 2,900
social policy bills, of which just over 2,100 bills propose the use of either direct
spending, tax expenditures, or loan guarantees. Social policy bills that fall under
the broad categories included in this analysis (health, workforce development and
training, education, traditional social welfare, and housing) compose approximately
one-fifth of all bills proposed during the 109th and 110th Congresses, and are central
to the debate over the role and size of government. Of these bills, three-fifths were
introduced by Democratic representatives (see Figure 3.2). The greater propensity
of Democrats to introduce bills reflects their preference for more government action
(Schiller 1995). Democratic members’ preference for direct policy tools, and in con-
trast, Republicans’ preference for indirect tools is also apparent from the sample of
bills. In general, the majority of bills (80 percent) propose altering direct government
spending, however a substantial minority (20 percent) of bills propose social policies
that would modify tax or loan subsidies. A small share of introduced bills, typically
bills proposing a larger policy initiative, use multiple policy mechanisms but most
members introduce bills that would achieve their social objective with a single policy
tool.
The bills that propose either direct or indirect policy mechanisms (or both) were
aggregated to generate counts of the types of bills each member sponsored. Bills
were aggregated by member within each Congress to generate the two dependent
variables used throughout the analyses: 1) the number of bills using direct policy
mechanisms each member sponsored and 2) the number of bills using indirect policy
mechanisms each member sponsored. A third member-level bill count—the total
number of social policy bills each member sponsored—was also created. The number
of social policy bills sponsored is used as a control variable in the analyses. It
controls for members’ overall propensity to introduce social policy bills of any type.
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Figure 3.2: Type of Policy Mechanism Proposed, by the Bill Sponsor’s Party Affili-
ation
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The hypotheses predict stronger financial ties with high dollar donors will influence
members’ relative preference for direct and indirect tools, not their overall level of
activity on social policy bills.
3.4.2 Explanatory Variables
The theory predicts big donors will alter members’ preferences for using direct
and indirect policy tools in the bills they introduce. Whether and how much mem-
bers of Congress respond to big donors when they consider what policy tools to
use in pursuit of their social objectives should depend on the importance of big
donors to members’ reelection goal. Members’ reliance on these donors is mea-
sured using the same fundraising variable created in Chapter 2, which measures the
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percentage of members’ overall campaign funds in the previous election cycle that
came from individual donors contributing $750 or more at one time. It is the total
dollar amount each member received in individual contributions of at least $750 as a
percentage of the total amount of campaign contributions the member received from
any source, including party committees, PACs, and individuals donating smaller
amounts.5 The information on campaign donations is from the Federal Election
Commission’s candidate summary files for the 2004 and 2006 election cycles.
Both models also account for additional factors previous research identifies as
important predictors of bill sponsorship and policy tool preferences. Ideology in-
fluences the resources members devote to bill sponsorship in general, and should
also impact the content of their bills. Liberals are likely to introduce more bills
than conservatives because most bills expand the role of government (Schiller 1995).
More liberal members of Congress should also be more inclined to propose direct
government spending as a policy solution, while more conservative members should
prefer indirect, market-based approaches (Howard 1997, 2007; Hacker 2002; Faricy
2011). Ideology is measured using Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) DW-NOMINATE
scores. This measure is an estimate of members’ position on the liberal-conservative
continuum based on their roll call voting patterns. DW-NOMINATE scores range
from -1 to 1, with higher values indicating greater ideological conservatism.
The content of the bills members choose to sponsor should also depend on the
characteristics of their district (Highton and Rocca 2005; Hayes, Hibbing, and Sulkin
2010). Four variables are included to account for district characteristics: the district
5In Chapter 2, members’ reliance on individual big donors was also measured using the percent-
age of funds raised from individuals that came from big donors. For the sake of brevity, this chapter
only presents analyses using the variable that represents the importance of individual high dollar
donors relative to all other sources of campaign funds, however, the models using the alternative
measure of members’ reliance on big donors yield similar substantive results. These results are
reported in Appendix B.
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poverty rate, the percentage of children and elderly in the district, and the
Democratic presidential candidate’s vote share in the previous election.
With the exception of the Democratic presidential vote share in the district, the
district characteristics are from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey.
The presidential vote share in the last election was collected from the Almanac of
American Politics.
In addition, bill sponsorship is affected by the institutional constraints and op-
portunities members of Congress face. Members have discretion over the bills they
introduce and often choose to be active on issues outside their committees’ juris-
dictions, however, committee membership is still an important determinant of bill
sponsorship (Schiller 1995, 2000; Woon 2009). A number of committees have juris-
diction over different aspects of social welfare policy, including the House Appropria-
tions, Budget, Education and Workforce, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services,
Veterans Affairs, and Ways and Means committees. Committee membership is
measured using a dummy variable that is coded one if members serve on any one of
these committees and zero otherwise. A separate dummy variable indicating House
Ways and Means committee membership is included in the model of indirect policy
bills. The House Committee on Ways and Means has jurisdiction over all federal
revenue bills. Thus, all tax expenditure bills, which make up the vast majority of
indirect policy bills included in this data set, are under their jurisdiction and mem-
bership on this committee should be a particularly important predictor of indirect
policy bill sponsorship.
Other institutional constraints are also known to impact bill sponsorship behav-
ior. In particular, a member’s institutional resources, such as party and committee
leadership, majority party status, and seniority, shape the number and types of bills
members of Congress sponsor (see, e.g., Schiller 1995; Woon 2009). Being a mem-
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mode Minimum Maximum
Direct Bills Introduced 1.95 2.64 – 0 26
Indirect Bills Introduced 0.63 1.24 – 0 15
Social Policy Bills Introduced 3.86 4.51 – 0 58
Percent in Poverty 0.13 0.06 – 0.04 0.4
Percent under Age 18 0.25 0.03 – 0.14 0.34
Percent Elderly 0.13 0.03 – 0.14 0.33
Democratic Presidential Vote 0.51 0.15 – 0.21 0.95
Ideology 0.10 0.50 – -0.76 1.24
High Dollar Donations 0.29 0.13 – 0 0.75
Leadership – – 0 0 1
Majority Party Member – – 1 0 1
Committee Member – – 1 0 1
Ways and Means Member – – 0 0 1
Seniority 7.50 4.10 – 1 27
53
ber of the majority or in a leadership position provides members with additional
institutional resources that give them more power to influence the legislative agenda
and should influence their sponsorship activity. Committee and party leadership
positions are indicated with separate dummy variables, as is majority party status.
Seniority is measured as the number of terms members have served in the U.S. House.
The descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analyses are presented in Table
3.1.
The influence of high dollar donors on the types of bills members introduce, par-
ticularly their preference for policy proposals with direct and indirect policy designs,
is modeled using negative binomial regression. Both dependent variables used in
the analyses—the number of direct and indirect bills members sponsor during each
Congress—are nonnegative count variables, which suggests a Poisson distribution is
appropriate. Like other bill sponsorship studies, however, the sponsorship data used
in this study show evidence of overdispersion, likely reflecting the large number of
representatives who did not sponsor any social policy bills, direct or indirect. The
observed variance in the bill count variables is about 3.5 and 3 times larger than the
mean for direct and indirect bills, respectively. The overdispersion present in the
data implies a negative binomial model is a better fit than a Poisson count model.
Separate models were estimated for the number of direct and indirect social policy
bills each member sponsored each Congress.
3.5 Results
The full results from the analyses of the number of direct and indirect bills mem-
bers in the U.S. House introduced are presented in Table 3.2. As anticipated, ties
with big donors impact members’ preferences for whether social benefits should be
delivered through direct or indirect policy mechanisms; however, the exact nature of
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donors’ influence is more nuanced. In particular, members of the U.S. House who
raise more money from big donors introduce fewer bills altering direct federal spend-
ing than similar members for whom big donors represent a less important source
of campaign funds, as evidenced by their campaign sources in the previous election
cycle. Importantly, having an established relationship with high dollar donors influ-
ences members’ likelihood of introducing direct spending bills even after controlling
for their overall activity on social policy issues, ideology, and district characteristics
like Democratic presidential vote share known to impact direct spending preferences.
The predicted change in the number of bills members introduce represents the
change in the dependent variable as each significant independent variable varies from
the observed minimum to the observed maximum, holding all other variables con-
stant at a specified value. For the model of proposed direct spending bills, the
discrete changes are calculated for the median member of Congress who receives the
average amount of campaign contributions from high dollar donors, is a member of
the majority party, sits on a committee with jurisdiction over social policy issues,
does not hold a leadership position, and is from a typical district in terms of de-
mographics and partisanship. The predicted changes are presented in Table 3.3. A
typical member of Congress sponsors about two social policy bills per Congress that
use direct policy mechanisms to achieve their desired policy outcome. For the me-
dian member of Congress, an increase from the observed minimum to the maximum
in the percentage of overall campaign funds from big donors reduces the expected
number of direct policy bills the member sponsors by one bill. Although the impact
of high dollar donors on members preference for direct policy tools appears small,
this change is substantially meaningful and implies members will introduce half the
number of direct social policy bills they otherwise would.6
6The magnitude of this effect is also consistent with the results of other bill sponsorship studies,
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Table 3.2: The Effect of High Dollar Donors on the Policy Tools Members Choose
Variable Direct Tools Indirect Tools
Social Policy Bills Introduced 0.15* 0.15*
(0.02) (0.02)
Percent in Poverty -0.15 -1.86
(0.63) (1.20)
Percent Under Age 18 1.92 -2.93
(1.45) (2.67)
Percent Elderly 0.65 -1.84
(1.39) (3.02)
Democratic Presidential Vote 0.45 1.07
(0.32) (0.58)
Ideology -0.48* 0.66*
(0.12) (0.17)
High Dollar Donations -0.90* -0.44
(0.27) (0.51)
Majority Party Member 0.17* -0.02
(0.05) (0.09)
Leadership 0.01 0.23
(0.10) (0.18)
Committee Member 0.20* -0.05
(0.08) (0.14)
Ways & Means Member 0.35*
(0.16)
Seniority -0.01 -0.05*
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant -0.83 -0.34
(0.53) (1.03)
N 851 851
Log Likelihood -1282.13 -772.34
Wald χ2 520.3* 136.7*
Note: Coefficients are negative binomial regression estimates.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* indicates p≤ .05, two-tailed tests.
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Table 3.3: Predicted Change in Bills Introduced for the Median Representative
Variable Direct Tools Indirect Tools
Ideology -1.5 0.7
High Dollar Donations -1.1 –
Majority Party Member 0.3 –
Committee Member 0.3 –
Ways & Means Member – 0.2
Seniority – -0.4
The results from Model 1 (the direct policy tools model) suggest members who
rely more heavily on big donors to fund their reelection campaigns sponsor fewer
direct policy bills, indicating that these members and likely the donors who fund their
campaigns have a less favorable view of using direct spending to achieve their policy
objectives. In contrast, contributions from high dollar donors do not impact the
extent to which members use indirect policy tools like tax and loan subsidies in their
bills.7 The number of indirect social policy bills members propose does not depend
on their relationship to high dollar donors. Several factors could be responsible for
the lack of support for the second hypothesis, which stated that a greater reliance on
big donors should increase members’ propensity to introduce bills relying on market-
even studies whose sample includes the complete universe of bills sponsored in a single Congress. For
instance, Woon (2009) finds that committee membership, which numerous studies have identified
as an important predictor of the number of bills sponsored on policies under that committee’s
jurisdiction, is related to an increase of between approximately one to five bills depending on
the committee and issue area. The literature connecting race and ethnicity of members to bill
sponsorship also finds similarly sized effects.
7The relative time members of Congress spend on direct versus indirect policy bills can also
be modeled as the percentage of social policy bills they introduce that are direct and indirect,
respectively. I estimated two ordinary least squares models that take this approach. The results
from the models are reported in Appendix B.
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based mechanisms to solve policy problems. One possibility for the null result is the
increasingly common view among members that indirect policies are a more feasible
way to achieve their policy objectives, given political gridlock and the difficulty of
advancing legislation that impacts direct government spending. The recent growth
in indirect policies, particularly tax expenditures, suggests this may be occurring.
An alternative explanation is that big donors have fairly strong preferences against
direct social policies, which typically represent a substantial expansion of government
and are progressive, but do not share uniform preferences about the social policies
government should be pursuing instead and the appropriate policy mechanisms for
doing so. Taken together, the results from the direct and indirect policy models imply
donors influence bill sponsorship, and may ultimately impact the legislative agenda
and policy output, by keeping certain types of policies off the legislative agenda that
may have otherwise been proposed (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Donors affect the
range of issues that are considered, and in particular, they make it less likely that
direct spending proposals make it on the agenda.
As expected, ideology also has a significant impact on the policy tools members
choose. Liberal representatives propose more direct social policies and fewer indirect
policies. In contrast, conservative members of Congress sponsor a greater number
of indirect policies and fewer direct policies than liberals. These results provide
micro-level evidence for the connection between party control and changes in direct
and indirect spending (Faricy 2011). Ideology also has a large substantive impact
on the number of bills members introduce. The most conservative member of the
US House is predicted to sponsor 1.5 fewer bills altering direct spending than the
most liberal member, which is a substantial decline given that the typical member
sponsors two direct policy bills each Congress (see Table 3.3). The effect size of
ideology on members’ preference for using indirect policy tools is smaller—the most
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conservative member sponsors 0.7 more indirect policy bills than the most liberal
member. While the impact of ideology on members’ decision to use indirect policy
mechanisms is smaller in absolute terms, the increase in the number of indirect bills is
substantively meaningful. On average, a member of Congress sponsors less than one
social policy bill that proposes using tax expenditures or loan subsidies in a typical
Congress. The most conservative member of the House sponsors almost double that
number of indirect bills.
Given the similarities between policy tools and ideology and the demonstrated
statistical relationship between these two concepts, do the results from the direct
policy tools model presented in Table 3.2 simply suggest that closer ties with big
donors make members more conservative? In other words, does the effect of donors
on members’ preferred policy approaches just show that donor ties pull members
to the right and make them less supportive of direct government intervention, or
does examining their impact on proposed policy tools provide information about an
additional aspect of members’ behavior? One way to address this question is to
consider whether ideology and donor ties have different impacts on policy tool pref-
erences for Democratic and Republican members. If greater ideological conservatism
uniformly decreases the likelihood members of both parties sponsor direct spending
bills, this result may indicate the policy tools measure is just picking up on members’
ideological movement in response to donors.
The results in Table 3.4 suggest preferences for direct policy tools are a separate
dimension of members’ legislative behavior that high dollar donors affect. As seen
in the direct policy tool model that combines Democrats and Republicans (Table
3.2), members from both parties who have close electoral ties to high dollar donors
are significantly less likely to introduce policy proposals that suggest delivering social
and economic benefits through direct spending. The impact (or nonimpact) of donors
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on members’ preferences for indirect tools is also the same as in the earlier combined
model. Unlike the combined model, however, the effect of ideology on preferences
for policy tools differs across the parties—ideology only affects the preferred policy
instruments of Democratic House members. More conservative Democratic members
are less likely to sponsor direct spending bills and more likely to sponsor indirect
policy bills than liberal Democrats. Ideology has no impact on Republican members’
preferred policy approach. Donor ties predict Republican members’ activity on direct
policy bills even though ideology does not.
One potential explanation for this result might be the Democratic and Republican
party platforms. The Republican party platform is explicit about the party’s stance
on the size of government and lowering, or at the very least not raising, taxes. The
efforts of Republican party activists, such as Grover Norquist, reinforce the party’s
position on these issues. These positions have direct implications for whether Repub-
licans will propose direct or indirect policies, regardless of their relative ideological
conservatism. In contrast, the Democratic party has a clear set of ideological goals,
but the party platform does not clearly specify how their goals should be accom-
plished. Taken together, these findings lend additional support to the notion that
preferences for policy tools are a distinct aspect of member behavior and provide
different information than ideology. They also reaffirm the conclusion that close ties
to big donors decrease members’ support for direct policy mechanisms.
Returning to the main model results presented in Table 3.2, committee mem-
bership and other institutional factors are also associated with bill sponsorship as
expected. Members of Congress frequently sponsor bills that correspond with their
committee’s jurisdiction. Membership on one of the committees that handles social
policy increases the number of direct policy bills by 0.3 bills. This effect may smaller
than members’ relationship with big individual donors and ideology because, unlike
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Table 3.4: The Relationship between High Dollar Donors, Policy Tools, and Ideology
Variable Direct Tools Indirect Tools
Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans
Social Policy Bills Introduced 0.14* 0.15* 0.14* 0.20*
(0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05)
Poverty 0.57 -0.15 -1.83 -4.48*
(0.69) (1.57) (1.43) (2.07)
Under 18 2.35* -0.83 -1.30 -15.72*
(1.43) (4.43) (2.72) (5.76)
Elderly 2.00 -3.99 -4.42 -6.96
(1.59) (3.16) (3.71) (4.77)
Leadership 0.12 -0.14 0.14 0.46*
(0.12) (0.19) (0.26) (0.20)
Majority 0.16* 0.21* -0.10 -0.03
(0.07) (0.10) (0.17) (0.13)
Committee Member 0.18* 0.24 -0.03 0.02
(0.09) (0.15) (0.20) (0.18)
Ways & Means Member 0.36* 0.27
(0.21) (0.26)
Seniority -0.022* -0.010 -0.03 -0.05*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Democratic Presidential Vote -0.13 1.15 1.80* 0.85
(0.38) (0.85) (0.93) (1.09)
Ideology -1.22* -1.26 2.61* 0.01
(0.34) (0.81) (0.82) (0.62)
High Dollar Donations -0.57* -1.34* -0.77 -0.08
(0.31) (0.46) (0.66) (0.66)
Constant -1.17* 0.63 -0.02 3.82
(0.55) (1.76) (1.12) (2.14)
N 425 425 425 425
Log Likelihood -729.35 -541.15 -369.70 -3387.41
Wald χ2 321.6* 85.9* 84.8* 63.0*
Note: Coefficients are negative binomial regression estimates.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* indicates p≤ .05, two-tailed tests.
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many other bill sponsorship studies, this study aggregates bills across multiple pol-
icy issues. Committee membership is likely to be a more important predictor of bill
sponsorship when the policy topic is narrower (for example, agriculture policy rather
than social policy) and the number of committees with jurisdiction over the issue
is small. The relative importance of committee membership for whether members
introduce bills on more specific policy topics is apparent in the indirect policy tools
model. The significant impact membership on the Ways and Means committee has
on members’ likelihood of sponsoring indirect policy bills is indicative of the fact that
all tax expenditure bills, which make up the vast majority of indirect bills included
in the data set, must go through the Ways and Means committee.
Majority party status and seniority also affect the number of direct and indi-
rect bills members introduce, respectively. Being a member of the majority party
increases the number of direct bills sponsored by 0.3 bills. This result is consistent
with the literature demonstrating the relative difficulty of advancing social policy
bills that change direct spending (Howard 2007). With limited resources, members
strategically choose how to allocate their time and are more likely to sponsor direct
spending bills when they are a member of the majority and the bill has a higher
chance of success. Similarly, more junior members of the US House may find it eas-
ier to advance indirect policy bills because tax and loan subsidies are more likely
to have bipartisan support (Howard 1997, 2007; Hacker 2002). A freshman member
of Congress is predicted to introduce 0.4 additional indirect policy bills relative to
the most senior member. Taken together, these results provide additional support
for the theory that members weigh the potential costs and benefits of sponsorship.
Bills with a greater chance of passage have a higher potential payoff for members
and increase the likelihood members introduce the bills.
District characteristics reflecting the electoral considerations members take into
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account do not affect their preference for direct or indirect policy tools, at least
in the models that combine all U.S. House members. Several studies demonstrate
that district characteristics influence bill sponsorship activity (see, e.g., Highton and
Rocca 2005), so it is somewhat surprising that constituency factors do not directly
factor into members’ sponsorship activity on different types of policy solutions. One
possibility is that the relationship between district characteristics and members’ pref-
erences for policy tools depends on members’ party affiliation. District character-
istics, in particular the percentage of the district in poverty and the percentage of
children, do influence policy tool preferences in sensible ways in the separate models
for Democratic and Republican members. The impact of constituency preferences
on the policy tools members of Congress use may also be partially picked up by the
inclusion of ideology in the model, since constituency preferences are an important
determinant of members’ ideological position.
3.6 Conclusion
These analyses suggest that members’ campaign fundraising, in particular the
sources they raise campaign resources from, influences their legislative behavior in
the U.S. House. The way members of Congress approach solving public policy prob-
lems, such as income security, unemployment, and affordable housing, is related to
their financial ties with big-donor individuals. Members who rely on these donors
as an important source of campaign funding are significantly less likely to propose
direct government spending as a policy solution, even after accounting for their ide-
ological leanings. This result indicates big donors influence members’ perspective
on the proper role of government in achieving social policy goals. Should social and
economic benefits be provided directly by the government or should the government
structure incentives to encourage provision and let the private sector figure out the
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details? A stronger connection with big donors does not impact members’ likelihood
of using market-based incentives, perhaps because of the increased use of indirect
policy instruments as a means to attract bipartisan support and overcome political
gridlock. But it does decrease the time and resources members of both parties spend
on bills that propose direct government action as the solution.
This finding contributes to our broader understanding of policy tools. Though
the variety of policy instruments policymakers use has increased over the past few
decades, our knowledge of how policymakers choose among the alternative policy
mechanisms available and the impacts of this choice on policy outcomes is still lim-
ited. The study lends additional support to the relationship between ideology and
tool choice put forth by prior work, and demonstrates that the importance of big
donors to members’ campaign fundraising strategy also affects the policy approach
members of Congress take. The pathway through which donors influence the perspec-
tive of members and the amount of time they spend advocating for direct government
action deserves further research. Given the time members of Congress spend main-
taining their relationships with donors and raising campaign funds, do the repeated
interactions between members and donors bias members’ perceptions of the elec-
torate’s preferences? Are members knowingly placing less priority on direct policy
bills to appeal to potential donors and cater to the wishes of their existing donor
base? Answering these questions will fill important gaps in our knowledge of how
members’ constant chase for money and the types of donors they rely on affect their
legislative behavior in Congress, perhaps at the expense of adequately representing
their district constituents.
The impact of big-donor individuals on policy outcomes ultimately depends on
what happens next in the legislative process. Bill sponsorship is only the first of many
steps members must take to turn their policy ideas into legislation. The number
64
of bills signed into law is exceedingly small relative to the number introduced in
any given Congress (Krutz 2005). Whether policy proposals are an important item
on the legislative agenda is often determined by members of Congress other than
the sponsoring member, such as the party leadership (Cox and McCubbins 1993,
2005) and other pivotal members (Krehbiel 1998), who exert greater control over
the legislative agenda at later stages. This study indicates campaign donors bias the
types of policies proposed for congressional consideration by keeping direct policies off
the agenda. The extent to which these members, especially party leaders, reinforce
the connection between fundraising motives and policy-making and the partisan
differences found here will affect the overall impact of donors on policy outcomes.
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4. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BIG DONORS FOR INCUMBENTS’ PRIMARY
PROSPECTS
4.1 Introduction
The cost of congressional elections has steadily increased over the last few decades.
Successful congressional candidates for the U.S. House spent an average of $706,129
in 1990; by the 2010 election, that number had more than doubled and increased to
over $1.4 million1. The increasing cost of running for reelection has led to concern
over the role of money in politics and the impact it has on members’ behavior in
office. The electoral connection encourages members of Congress to represent their
district constituents or risk being voted out of office at the next election. Earning
the support of voters in the district is only one part of the equation for electoral
success, however. Members of Congress must also raise ever larger sums of money to
compete. Building a large war chest serves several purposes for members of Congress.
It can help ward off potential challengers2 and gives members the resources to run
a successful campaign against any challengers who do emerge. Fundraising ability is
typically seen as a campaign advantage for House members, but prior work focuses
on the amount of campaign resources members have and overlooks the implications
of where members of Congress receive their money from.
Members of Congress look to a variety of sources, including political action com-
mittees, corporations, their party organization, and individuals when they raise re-
1Costs are in 2010 dollars and based on the Campaign Finance Institute’s analysis of Federal
Election Commission data (http://www.cfinst.org/data/VitalStats.aspx).
2The literature on war chests and challenger entry focuses largely on U.S. House general elections
and yields mixed evidence that large war chests deter challengers. For evidence in support of
a relationship between war chests and challenger entry see Hersch and McDougall (1994), Box-
Steffensmeier (1996), and Carson (2005). For evidence against a deterrence effect, see Goodliffe
(2001) and Krasno and Green (1988).
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sources for their reelection campaign. A greater ability to raise money from any of
these sources should help, not hurt, a member’s electoral prospects, but this argu-
ment assumes campaign donations do not alter members’ behavior in other ways
that increase their electoral vulnerability. This study advances our understanding
of the relationship between campaign resources and members’ reelection chances by
examining the potential for fundraising incentives to affect members’ representation
of their district, and as a result, their electoral vulnerability. The extent to which
members of Congress rely on contributions from individual big donors varies, but in-
dividual contributions are the largest source of campaign funds for the typical mem-
ber despite the literature’s focus on political action committees (Ansolabehere, de
Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003). The constant pressure to chase money and adequately
fund their reelection campaigns may create incentives for members of Congress to
cater to big-donor individuals, the majority of whom reside outside their district.
To the extent that the interests and preferences of campaign donors and district
constituents overlap, members of Congress will not necessarily face a tension between
attracting the financial support of donors and the electoral support of their district.
But to the extent their preferences differ, and research suggests they do (see, e.g.,
Francia et al. 2003), the financial payoff from catering to the wishes of campaign
donors may cause members to stray from representing their district. The link between
members and their district constituents may weaken in subtle ways. For instance,
members of Congress may spend a substantial portion of their time that would
normally be spent at home in their district fundraising and maintaining relationships
with large campaign contributors instead. Strong financial ties to individual big
donors may also influence members’ actions in Congress, for example by affecting
their roll call voting behavior.3 If big donors create a disconnect between members
3The results in Chapter 2 suggest donors do influence roll call voting among U.S. House members.
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and their geographic constituency, their electoral prospects may be affected.
This study assesses the relationship between close ties with donors and members’
electoral prospects by examining the emergence of well-qualified challengers in the
primary election. An incumbent’s high probability of winning most congressional
races discourages quality challengers, who know they are likely to lose, from running
against them (Cox and Katz 1996). Potential candidates who sense a disconnect be-
tween members and their district constituents, however, may see it as opportunity to
successfully challenge the incumbent. Building on the strategic candidate emergence
literature, this study examines whether the sources of members’ campaign resources
affect the likelihood a quality candidate challenges an incumbent from within their
own party, and looks at incumbents’ electoral success when they challenged. The
results suggest money is not always an advantage in elections. Raising a substan-
tial share of their campaign funds from big-donor individuals increases the chances
some incumbents face a quality primary challenger and lowers their primary vote
share when a challenger does emerge. However, for other incumbents, campaign
fundraising from donors does not seem to impact their electoral success and may
even help them. The results indicate incumbent candidates’ party affects the rela-
tionship between campaign donations and the likelihood they face tough primary
election competition.
4.2 Literature Review
Electoral competition for U.S. House seats greatly depends on whether the incum-
bent officeholder is running for reelection. Incumbent candidates have an electoral
advantage. Their reelection rate is high (90 percent in the 2012 general election) in
In particular, members who receive a greater share of their campaign contributions from individual
high dollar donors move to the right ideologically. The connection between donors and members
leads to more moderate voting records among Democratic members and more extreme voting records
among Republicans.
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part because they have the political and financial resources necessary to run a suc-
cessful campaign. The success of incumbents is also linked, however, to how much
their electoral advantages deter potential competition during the primary and gen-
eral elections (Cox and Katz 1996; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2000; Stone,
Maisel, and Maestas 2004). Races with an incumbent are generally less competitive
than open seat races and the challengers they do face are typically less qualified.
Whether incumbents face a quality challenger depends on the strategic choices
potential challengers make. Prior work on candidate emergence demonstrates that
potential candidates are rational actors. Potential challengers, especially those with
more qualifications, respond to variation in the incumbent’s resources and qualifi-
cations, and changes in the district and overall political environments that affect
their chance of winning (Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Bianco 1984; Bond, Covington,
and Fleisher 1985; Jacobson 1989; Maisel and Stone 1997; Stone and Maisel 2003;
Stone, Maisel, and Maestas 2004; Carson 2005). This extensive literature provides
strong support for the strategic candidates theory first advanced by Black (1972)
and Jacobson and Kernell (1983). While the evidence for rational behavior on the
part of potential challengers comes primarily from studies of general elections for
U.S. House seats, these studies offer a foundation for understanding challenger emer-
gence in congressional primaries as well. Potential challengers considering a bid for
a congressional seat must win two election contests: their party’s nomination in the
primary and a majority of the vote in the general election. Because the probability of
winning the general election is affected by their likelihood of winning in the primary,
challengers likely rely on similar strategic calculations to assess their chances at both
electoral stages (Maisel and Stone 2001).
One of the main findings from the strategic candidate emergence literature is that
candidates challenge incumbents when they perceive the incumbent is vulnerable.
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Signals that the incumbent candidate is electorally vulnerable can come in several
forms. From year to year and across districts within any given election year, potential
candidates respond to changes in district partisanship and national partisan tides and
legislators’ electoral performance in the previous election (Jacobson and Kernell 1983;
Jacobson 1989). Incumbents with a strong electoral performance in the last election
and who represent districts with a favorable partisan composition are less likely to
face a challenger. While rare, involvement in a scandal also matters. Incumbents
involved in a scandal often strategically retire rather than risk losing reelection, but
scandals do send a strong signal about incumbent’s electoral prospects among those
incumbents who decide to run again (Peters and Welch 1980; Welch and Hibbing
1997).
In addition to these indications of an incumbent’s vulnerability, potential chal-
lengers also consider the incumbent’s fundraising ability. A large war chest deters
potential challengers because it increases the cost of beating the incumbent in the
election and is an indication of support for the incumbent (Hersch and McDougall
1994; Box-Steffensmeier 1996; Carson 2005). Challengers for U.S. House seats have
a difficult time raising enough money to wage a successful campaign against well-
funded incumbents, particularly in primary elections where challengers have difficulty
raising money from political action committees (Goodliffe and Magleby 2001). While
some studies (most notably Krasno and Green (1998) and Goodliffe (2001)) find that
war chests do not affect candidate entry, to my knowledge no study argues that build-
ing a substantial war chest puts incumbents at a disadvantage. This study offers a
new take on the relationship between war chests and incumbent’s electoral prospects
by considering the sources of incumbents’ campaign funds and the implications the
sources have for challenger entry and incumbent electoral success.
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4.3 Theory
The types of contributions a member of Congress receives, particularly the share
of their funding that comes from high dollar individual donors, may affect how well
they represent the interests of voters in their district and consequently their electoral
vulnerability. As running a successful congressional campaign becomes increasingly
expensive, members of Congress must solicit donations from a larger group of donors.
Members may seek additional campaign funds from multiple sources, including po-
litical action committees or corporations, however, some members raise money by
establishing and maintaining strong ties with wealthy individual donors who make
large contributions.
Strong financial ties to big donors have the potential to adversely affect how well
members of Congress represent their district. A majority of individual donations to
members of Congress come from donors who reside outside the district. High dol-
lar donors are concentrated in a small number of neighborhoods across the country,
described as “donor districts” by Gimpel and colleagues (Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-
Merkowitz 2008). Donors in this relatively small group of zipcodes account for the
majority of individual campaign donations for members of Congress across the coun-
try. The extent to which members rely on the individual donations that flow from
these districts to congressional candidates in other locales varies4, but more than
two-thirds of all campaign funds raised from individual donors come from outside
the district in a typical race (Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2008). When the
preferences of high dollar donors differ from the typical voter in the district, members
who are attuned to the preferences of high dollar donors are likely to face a tension
between representing the individuals who fund their campaign and representing the
4See Chapter 2 for descriptive statistics on congressional campaign funding sources across mem-
bers and parties.
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individuals who can vote for them.
Members of Congress are more likely to respond to the financial incentives to
represent big donors, even when it pulls them away from representing their district
constituency, when they have an existing relationship with these donors that they
wish to maintain. The analyses in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 suggest big donor ties
do affect congressional behavior. Donor relationships influence members’ roll call
voting patterns and bill sponsorship behavior. In particular, stronger financial ties
to high dollar donors are associated with more ideologically moderate roll call voting
among Democrats and more extreme roll call voting among Republicans than one
would expect given the composition of members’ districts5. Donor ties also affect the
types of policies members prioritize at earlier stages of the legislative process. Even
after controlling for district characteristics and ideology, members of both parties
are less likely to propose direct government spending policies when a greater share
of their campaign funding comes from high dollar donors6. Taken together, these
results indicate high dollar donors influence members’ behavior, often at the expense
of their alignment with district preferences.
It is also probable that donors influence members’ electoral prospects by altering
the district electorate’s perception of how well their member represents their inter-
ests and their personal vote. Attracting and maintaining the support of big donors is
a significant time investment. Studies of individuals who contribute to presidential
campaigns suggest big donors expect candidates to make a personal, often in-person,
appeal for their support (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995). Contacting wealthy
potential donors takes up a large amount of time for most members. Newly elected
House Democrats in the 113th Congress were informed about exactly how much
5A more complete explanation of these results is included in Chapter 2.
6A more complete explanation of these results in included in Chapter 3.
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time they would be spending raising money for the next election cycle shortly after
the new session started. In their meeting with Democratic freshman, the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee shared the ideal schedule members should keep,
which includes four hours of fundraising calls in a single eight hour workday (Klein
2013). The time members of Congress spend cultivating their relationship with high
dollar donors takes away from the time they have available to spend connecting with
voters in their district and conducting constituency service. Yet these constituency
activities help members of Congress increase their visibility and improve their rep-
utation among the district electorate, bolstering their electoral prospects (Mayhew
1974; Fenno 1978; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987).
Failing to spend enough time engaging with the district electorate and represent-
ing donor preferences in Congress may have implications for the electoral security of
these incumbents. While donor ties could possibly affect the electoral success of in-
cumbents in both the general and primary congressional elections, this study focuses
on the implications for members’ primary prospects. Many congressional seats are
relatively safe for incumbents and incumbents in the typical district are unlikely to
face stiff competition in the general election. Congressional primaries are also fairly
uncompetitive, on average (Maisel and Stone 2001), however, the engaged partisans
who participate in primary elections are the most likely to be dissatisfied with the
lower quality (or perceived lower quality) of representation.
Incumbents have an electoral advantage and being defeated in a congressional
primary election is unusual. The few primary losses that do occur, however, gener-
ally happen to ideological moderates who are less extreme than the primary voters
in their district (Brady, Han, and Pope 2007). Relative to the general electorate,
primary voters are more ideologically homogenous and favor ideologically extreme
candidates, especially in today’s polarized political environment (Levendusky 2009).
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In other words, Democrats are more likely to face successful primary challenges from
more liberal candidates and Republicans are more likely to face successful primary
challenges from more conservative candidates. The findings in Chapters 2 and 3
suggest high dollar donations pull members of both parties in the same direction—to
the right. This effect implies Democrats with closer connections to big donors may
be more susceptible to a strong primary challenge than Republicans who rely on
similar campaign funding sources.
Strong primary challenges as a result of incumbents being out of step with their
primary constituency do not necessarily depend on primary voters’ direct response
to the ideological disconnect between members and their district. The candidate pri-
mary voters elect ultimately depends on whether the incumbent is challenged at all
and if so, the quality of the candidates in the race. Quality challengers typically have
greater fundraising ability and qualifications like previous experience as an elected
official. Primary voters must first have more than one candidate to choose from
and must have at least one option that seems better than the incumbent. While
recruiting quality challengers to run against an incumbent is difficult, quality pri-
mary challengers are more likely to emerge when the incumbent is relatively vulner-
able and their probability of winning the primary election is higher. The evidence
on challenger emergence in general congressional elections suggests quality primary
challengers are especially likely to respond to changes in the costs and benefits of
running and the probability of winning (Jacobson and Kernell 1983). When primary
voters are dissatisfied with their current representative, strong primary challengers
are more likely react to the incumbent’s decreased popularity among their fellow
partisans by entering the primary race.
How voters respond to a primary race with a contested incumbent should depend
on whether a quality primary challenger emerges and the resources incumbents can
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use to defend their congressional seat. A quality primary challenger gives primary
voters a reasonable alternative to the incumbent and should decrease the incumbent’s
primary vote share. It is rare for incumbents to lose congressional elections, however,
even when they do face a strong primary challenge. Even vulnerable incumbents
have a number of resources they can harness to increase their electoral support,
particularly their ability to raise more money. This theoretical framework implies
two testable hypotheses: 1) Incumbents, particularly Democratic incumbents, who
receive a significant share of their campaign funding from big donors should more
likely to face a quality primary challenger, and 2) The ability to access these types
of donations should help incumbents efficiently raise money to win a substantial
share of the primary vote even when facing a quality primary challenger. However,
because these donor ties pull Democratic incumbents further from their primary
base, raising additional money from these sources may not help them overcome their
electoral disadvantage in the primaries.
4.4 Data and Methods
This analysis tests the implications of high dollar donor ties for members’ primary
election prospects using data on the 2006 and 2008 congressional elections. The
models address two questions: do relationships with big donors increase the chance
members are challenged in the following primary election and if they are challenged,
how successful are their primary challengers? Since the theory focuses exclusively
on how incumbents fare in their primary reelection bids, the analysis only includes
primary races with an incumbent; open seat races are excluded from the analysis.
The set of congressional primary races in 2006 and 2008 with an incumbent running
for reelection was compiled using The Almanac of American Politics.
Next, data on the primary challenges these incumbents faced was collected from
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both The Almanac of American Politics and the Federal Election Commission (FEC)
Candidate Financial Summary Files. The FEC files offer a more complete picture of
how many challengers entered the primary race, because any individual who wants to
run for Congress and raises or spends more than $5,000 on campaign activities must
file with the FEC. While the FEC data on primary challengers is in some respects
more complete, not all of these individuals actually appear on the primary election
ballot. The list of House primary races with any primary challenger was narrowed
down to races where the incumbent faced a challenger on primary election day using
the Almanac.7
The majority of incumbents run uncontested in primary elections for U.S. House
seats. Of the incumbents running for reelection, slightly more than one in every
five have their seats contested by a challenger in the primary election. The share
of incumbents who face a quality challenger during the primaries is smaller still,
but whether incumbents face a quality primary challenger is a stronger test of the
theory. Quality primary challengers are the most likely to strategically emerge in
response to factors in the political environment that affect their changes of beating
the incumbent. Incumbent vulnerability due to inadequate representation of their
district constituents is one such factor that may affect their entry into the race. In
contrast, other primary challengers may decide to enter the race for a variety of
reasons unrelated to the vulnerability of the incumbent candidate.
Quality primary challengers can be defined in several ways. This analysis
uses fundraising success as a proxy measure for quality primary challengers (Bond,
Covington, and Fleisher 1985). Fundraising ability addresses two related aspects of
7Members of Congress were only coded as receiving a primary challenge if they had to compete
against a candidate from the same party during the primary election. Some states like Washington
and California have blanket primary systems where all primary candidates directly compete against
one another regardless of party.
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being a quality challenger. Campaign donations are more likely to flow to viable pri-
mary challengers and greater campaign resources are necessary to wage a competitive
primary campaign against an incumbent. Candidates who raise more than $50,000,
as reported to the FEC and included in the Candidate Financial Summary Files, are
considered quality primary challengers.8 In the typical 2006 and 2008 congressional
race with a challenger, the challenger who was most successful at fundraising raised
approximately $160,000. Using this definition of a quality primary challenger, about
two-fifths of all incumbents who had to run against a challenger in the primaries
faced a quality primary challenger.
The first model (Model 1) tests for the probability a quality primary challenger
enters the congressional primaries for U.S . House seats. The dependent variable
in Model 1 is coded one if the House incumbent faces a quality primary challenger
as defined above and zero otherwise. Because the emergence of a quality primary
challenger is a binary outcome, Model 1 is estimated as a logistic regression. Model
2 examines the electoral performance of incumbents when a primary challenger does
emerge. When House incumbents receive a primary challenge (from any challenger,
not just a quality primary challenger), how successfully do they defend themselves
against the primary challenger? Model 2 includes all U.S House races where an
incumbent was challenged during the congressional primaries and estimates the in-
cumbent’s success during the primary election as measured by their primary vote
share. How successful incumbents are when they receive a primary challenge is mea-
sured using the percentage of the primary vote they receive rather than whether they
win or lose in the primary because defeating an incumbent is unlikely even when they
are vulnerable. The incumbent’s primary vote share captures the extent to which
8The model results are not sensitive to the specific fundraising threshold chosen. Remarkably
similar results are obtained when the fundraising threshold for a quality primary challenger is
increased to $75,000 or $100,000.
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the primary challenger is able to mount a serious challenge to the incumbent. The
impact of these factors on the incumbent’s primary vote share is estimated using an
ordinary least squares regression model.
4.4.1 Accounting for the Implications of Strong Big Donor Ties
Because this study focuses on whether big donor ties affect incumbents’ electoral
advantage, the main independent variable of interest is the incumbent’s reliance on
individual high dollar contributions during the last election cycle. This variable
measures the extent to which members of Congress are motivated to represent the
interests of big donors who may be a small subset of their district constituency, or in
many cases, reside outside the district. Members of Congress who have not received
strong support from high dollar donors in recent past elections are less likely to
respond to the incentives to represent these donors’ interests to retain their financial
support in the future.
The strength of the relationship between incumbents and big donors is measured
using the same high dollar donations variable that was used in the previous chap-
ters.9 The variable represents the percentage of the incumbent’s overall campaign
funds that came from individuals contributing at least $750 at one time during the
previous election cycle. The numerator is the total dollar amount each incumbent
received in individual donations of $750 or more, and the denominator is the incum-
bent’s total campaign contributions from any source, including party committees,
political action committees, and individuals making smaller donations. This cam-
paign finance information is also from the FEC’s candidate summary files. Data
on incumbents’ fundraising during the 2004 election cycle is used to predict their
primary challenges in the 2006 election and 2006 fundraising data is used to predict
9The data section in the first empirical chapter includes a detailed description of the high dollar
donations variable.
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their primary challenges in the 2008 election.
The theory implies Democrats who receive a larger share of their campaign fund-
ing from high dollar donors should be more likely to face a primary challenge from
the left than Republicans with a similar reliance on high dollar donations are to face
a challenge from the right. The different implications of big donors for the ideological
positioning of Democrats and Republicans may also affect their performance in the
primaries when they are challenged. An interaction between the incumbent’s
party and their reliance on high dollar donors during the previous election
cycle is included in Models 1 and 2 to test whether big donors affect incumbent’s
primary election prospects differently depending on their party. The incumbent’s
party is also included in the model.
4.4.2 Additional Explanatory Variables
Both models also control for several other factors that affect an incumbent’s
vulnerability during the primary election. Incumbent’s ideological positioning should
affect their primary election prospects. Primary voters are more ideologically extreme
than the average voter in the general election, hence moderate incumbents are more
susceptible to successful primary challenges in congressional primaries (Brady, Han,
and Pope 2007). In the analysis, incumbents’ ideological extremity is measured using
Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) DW-NOMINATE scores, which estimate the liberal-
conservative ideological position of members of Congress on the basis of their roll call
voting record. This measure of incumbent’s liberalism and conservatism is converted
into a measure of their ideological extremism by taking the absolute value of their
ideological position. More extreme incumbents have higher values of the ideological
extremity measure and more moderate incumbents have lower values.
Freshman House members are also especially likely to face a strong primary chal-
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lenge. Their freshman status implies they have had less time to cultivate their
personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Fenno 1978) and fewer oppor-
tunities to engage in the three activities—crediting-claiming, position-taking, and
advertising—incumbents use to secure their reelection (Mayhew 1974). Freshman
status is included in the model as a dummy variable and coded one if the incumbent
is a freshman member and zero otherwise. Both models also control for whether the
incumbent was recently involved in a scandal, which may also weaken their reelec-
tion bid. Whether the incumbent was embroiled in a political or personal scandal
was coded using two sources: a list of investigations undertaken by the House Ethics
committee during the most recent Congress and a list of members under investiga-
tion by various entities such as the FEC compiled by Citizens for Responsibility and
Ethics in Washington.10 Involvement in a scandal was also included as a dummy
variable, which was coded one in the event the incumbent had a recent scandal and
zero otherwise.
The emergence of quality primary challengers and challengers’ success when they
do run against the incumbent should also depend on the incumbent’s electoral suc-
cess during the previous election cycle. Quality primary challengers should be more
likely to run against an incumbent when the incumbent’s last House race signaled
either their inability to build a large war chest or that the incumbent’s seat was
relatively unsafe. The natural logarithm of the incumbent’s total money raised
during the previous election11 and their previous general election vote share
were included in both models. The partisanship of the district and how ”safe”
the incumbent’s House seat is as a result may also impact the emergence of a qual-
ity primary challenger in another way. A heavily partisan and therefore relatively
10www.citizensforethics.org
11The natural logarithm of campaign receipts accounts for the diminishing marginal returns of
raising additional campaign funds (Jacobson 1980).
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safe congressional district should affect the likelihood a quality primary challenger
emerges, however, the direction of its impact is ambiguous. While the in-party’s
nomination will be more difficult to win in a more partisan district, the nomination
has a greater potential benefit to the challenger if they do win because their chances
of winning the general election are higher (Maisel and Stone 2001; Stone and Maisel
2003). This potential effect is controlled for by including the vote percentage the
presidential candidate from the House incumbent’s party received during the most
recent presidential election.
Two additional variables that capture the district’s political environment and the
competitiveness of the congressional primary race are also included in both models.
Redistricting can create opportunities for a strong primary challenger to emerge and
win because redrawing the district lines can significantly alter the composition of
the incumbent’s district and make their reelection less certain (Cox and Katz 2002).
Redistricting occurs after each decennial Census and should not affect the 2006
and 2008 congressional primary elections, however, Georgia conducted mid-decade
redistricting in 2005. Because Georgia’s mid-decade redistricting may affect strategic
primary candidate emergence and the incumbent’s primary vote, a dummy variable is
included to account for the impact redistricting may have on the 2006 House primary
races in Georgia. Several states also have different primary systems that affect the
competitiveness of the primary election.12 A dummy variable is included to account
for this effect.
12Louisiana and Washington had nonpartisan blanket primary elections during the years included
here. Louisiana and Washington had blanket primaries in 2006 and 2008, respectively. California’s
blanket primary system is frequently discussed, but was not used by the state in either the 2006 or
2008 primary elections.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics (All Incumbent Races)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mode Minimum Maximum
Quality Primary Challenge – – 0 0 1
Freshman – – 0 0 1
Scandal – – 0 0 1
General Election Vote 0.68 0.13 – 0.46 0.99
Total Receipts (ln) 13.9 0.57 – 11.3 15.9
Democrat – – 1 0 1
High Dollar Donations 0.29 0.13 – 0.02 0.75
Ideological Extremity 0.48 0.17 – 0.01 1.24
Party Presidential Vote 0.60 0.11 – 0.29 0.95
Redistricting – – 0 0 1
Primary System – – 0 0 1
In general, Model 1 and Model 2 include the same set of independent variables,
however, Model 2 also includes two additional independent variables that may af-
fect the incumbent’s primary vote share but not the emergence of a quality primary
challenger. Model 2 controls for the number of challengers the incumbent faces in
the primary election. More candidates should result in a lower vote share for the
incumbent candidate. Because Model 2 includes all House races where the incum-
bent faces a primary challenger regardless of the quality of the challenger, a dummy
variable that indicates whether at least one of the challengers was a quality primary
challenger (using the same definition of quality primary challenger as above) was also
included. Running against a quality primary challenger should reduce the incum-
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bent’s vote share in the primary election. The descriptive statistics for all variables
used in Model 1 and Model 2 are in Table 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics (Incumbent Races with a Primary Challenger)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mode Minimum Maximum
Primary Vote Share 75.9 14.8 – 25 93
Freshman – – 0 0 1
Scandal – – 0 0 1
General Election Vote 0.69 0.12 – 0.48 0.99
Total Receipts (ln) 13.8 0.59 – 12.1 15.5
Democrat – – 1 0 1
High Dollar Donations 0.29 0.12 – 0.02 0.68
Ideological Extremity 0.50 0.19 – 0.04 1.24
Party Presidential Vote 0.62 0.11 – 0.34 0.88
Redistricting – – 0 0 1
Primary System – – 0 0 1
Number of Challengers 1.29 0.65 1 1 6
Quality Challenger – – 0 0 1
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Primary Challenger Emergence
The first model tests the implications of financial ties with high dollar donors
for incumbents’ vulnerability to strong challenges in congressional primary elections.
This model includes all 2006 and 2008 U.S. House primary races with an incumbent
running for reelection. The full results from the logistic regression model are pre-
sented in Table 4.3. As expected, ties with individual big donors increase the chance
that a quality primary challenger will enter the race, but not for candidates of both
parties. The interaction between donations and party is significant, and reliance on
the campaign contributions of high dollar donors uniquely disadvantages Democratic
incumbents in the primary election. These connections increase the likelihood Demo-
cratic members face a quality primary challenge in the following election cycle. In
contrast, Republican incumbents with big donor ties actually benefit in the primary
elections. As their reliance on high dollar donors increases, their chance of facing a
well-funded, well-qualified challenger from within their own partisan ranks declines
significantly.
The substantive impact of high dollar donations on quality primary challenger
entry is shown in greater detail in Figure 4.1. This figure depicts the predicted prob-
ability an incumbent faces a quality primary challenger, while all other continuous
variables are held constant at their mean value and dichotomous variables are held
constant at the mode. The electoral security of most House incumbents is apparent in
Figure 4.1. The odds an incumbent candidate will face a quality primary challenger
is almost always lower than one in ten. The dramatically different electoral tradeoff
raising money from big-donor individuals presents for Democrats and Republicans
is also apparent. The probability a Democratic incumbent runs against a quality
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Table 4.3: Incumbent Vulnerability to Quality Primary Challenges
Variable Coefficient Change in Predicted
(Std. Err.) Probabilities (+/- 0.5 s.d.)
Freshman 0.35 0.006
(0.48)
Scandal 1.95** 0.015
(0.62)
General Election Vote(t−1) -7.10** -0.049
(2.49)
Total Receipts (ln)(t−1) -0.85** -0.026
(0.30)
Democrat -0.99 -0.026
(0.70)
High Dollar Donations(t−1) -1.82 -0.012
(1.62)
Donations*Democrat 3.84* 0.034
(2.22)
Ideological Extremity 1.19 0.011
(1.77)
Incumbent Party Presidential Vote 5.59** 0.033
(2.44)
Redistricting 1.90** 0.013
(0.91)
Primary System 0.22 0.001
(0.87)
Constant 10.37**
(4.79)
N 782
Pseudo R-squared 0.11
Note: Coefficients are logistic regression estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses.
** indicates p≤ .05, * indicates p≤ .10, two-tailed tests.
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Figure 4.1: Predicted Probability of Quality Primary Challenger Entry
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challenger in the congressional primaries doubles as the share of their overall dona-
tions from big-donor individuals increases from close to 0 percent to over 50 percent.
Conversely, Republican incumbents fare better in the congressional primaries when
the share of their campaign funds from these donors increases, holding all else con-
stant. A similar increase in high dollar donations cuts in half the chance Republican
incumbents face a quality primary challenger. The predicted probabilities are also
shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Predicted Probability of Quality Primary Challenger Emergence
Democrats Republicans
High Dollar Donations = 0.02 0.04* 0.09*
(0.02) (0.04)
High Dollar Donations = 0.03 0.04* 0.09*
(0.02) (0.04)
High Dollar Donations = 0.16 0.04* 0.07*
(0.01) (0.02)
High Dollar Donations = 0.29 0.05* 0.06*
(0.01) (0.01)
High Dollar Donations = 0.42 0.06* 0.05*
(0.02) (0.01)
High Dollar Donations = 0.55 0.08* 0.04*
(0.03) (0.02)
High Dollar Donations = 0.75 0.12 0.04
(0.07) (0.03)
Note: * indicates predicted probabilities are significant at the 0.05 level.
The distinct impact of high dollar donations on Democratic and Republican in-
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cumbents provides further, albeit indirect, support that the preferences of big donors
tend to shift members from both parties to the right. This ideological movement
would place Democratic incumbents to the right of many of their constituents, and
certainly to the right of their primary electorate who likely favor more extreme
candidates. Republicans who move to the right are likely to be more ideologically
proximate to their primary electorate and less likely to be challenged as a result.
The Model 1 results are consistent with these theoretical expectations. While the
model does not directly test whether campaign fundraising affects the time members
spend in their district and engaging in constituency service, this explanation seems
less plausible based on the results here because Democratic and Republican members
should both be disadvantaged by the time fundraising takes away from their district
activities. The results do not rule out the possibility fundraising activity has this
effect, but a different mechanism is likely driving the partisan differences we see.
The chance an incumbent faces a quality primary challenger also depends on
their strategic assessment of other factors in sensible ways. The incumbent’s perfor-
mance in the previous election, both financially and electorally, alters the probability
a quality primary challenger runs. Their vote share in the previous election is one
indication of the the incumbent’s popularity among district voters and the likelihood
of a successful primary challenge. A one standard deviation increase in their vote
share in the most recent general election decreases the predicted probability of fac-
ing a quality primary challenger by almost five percent. In addition to their vote
share, the incumbent’s fundraising ability in the previous election also appears to
factor into challengers’ decision calculus. Greater fundraising success in the most re-
cent election significantly decreases the chance a quality primary challenge emerges.
A one standard deviation increase in the campaign receipts variable decreases the
probability of running against a quality primary challenger about 3 percent.
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Though the political scandals that do occur receive considerable media coverage,
scandals involving incumbents are relatively rare in Congress. Fewer than 5 percent
of all incumbent candidates experienced a scandal during the previous two years of
office, likely because incumbents involved in major scandals typically retire or resign
from office. For the incumbents who do run for reelection after a recent scandal,
however, the scandal greatly increases their probability of running against a quality
challenger in the primary election. The predicted probability of quality primary
challenger entry increases by over 20 percent for incumbents with recent scandals,
which demonstrates why so many retire or resign rather than run for reelection.
The final control variable that affects incumbents’ perceived vulnerability and the
likelihood a challenger can win the seat is redistricting. Redistricting only occurred
in one state (Georgia) during the years included in this analysis, but the results are
suggestive of the impact redrawing congressional lines has on incumbent’s electoral
security. Altering their district can significantly change the partisan composition of
their district and often means they need to work to establish their reputation and
personal vote among their new constituents. In House races with an incumbent,
redistricting often causes relatively high incumbent turnover and offers potential
challengers their best chance at defeating the sitting member (see, e.g., Hetherington,
Larson, and Globetti 2003).
The factors described above influence potential challengers’ perception of their
likelihood of winning. The results suggest the incumbent party’s vote share also af-
fects their decision to run, but through impacting a different aspect of their strategic
considerations. The in-party vote share in the last presidential election is an indi-
cation of how partisan, and by extension how safe, the district is. Highly partisan,
safe districts increase the value of winning the seat to potential challengers because
they would have more electoral security in the future if they did win the seat. A one
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standard deviation increase in the in-party’s vote share from half a standard devia-
tion below the mean to half a standard deviation above increases the probability of
quality primary challenger emergence by about 3 percent.
The results from the model of quality primary challenger emergence offer support
for the main theoretical argument proposed here and provide additional support for
strategic challenger behavior in primary elections. Though these findings demon-
strate that potential candidates, who are political elites, respond to the signals sent
by the funding sources of incumbents’ war chests, it is unclear whether and how
primary voters respond. Model 2 addresses this question by examining incumbent
primary vote share in situations where challengers run.
4.5.2 Incumbent Vote Share in Contested Primaries
How do incumbents fare in the congressional primaries when challengers do enter
the race? The second model (see Table 4.5 for the results) estimates the impact
of big donors on the incumbent’s electoral vote share in contested primaries. The
results support the conclusion drawn from the first analysis. Big donor ties impact
incumbent’s primary election prospects by making it more likely they face a quality
primary challenger and see a corresponding decline in their primary vote share as a
result. Having to compete against a quality primary challenger is associated with a
substantial decline—on average, about 15 percent—in the percentage of the primary
vote they receive.
The results also suggest incumbents’ relationship with big donors directly af-
fects their primary vote share, though only among Republican candidates. Being
more reliant on high dollar contributions actually increases the electoral success of
Republican incumbents in the primary election.13 This effect occurs even after con-
13All incumbents receive some portion of their campaign contributions, albeit sometimes a very
small portion, from high dollar donors. Since the percentage of campaign funds from big donors
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Table 4.5: The Primary Vote Share of Challenged Incumbents
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Freshman -3.38
(2.57)
Scandal -7.42*
(3.92)
General Election Vote(t−1) 5.87
(10.93)
Total Receipts (ln)(t−1) 2.84*
(1.53)
Democrat 10.38**
(4.65)
High Dollar Donations(t−1) 20.50**
(10.10)
Donations*Democrat -16.06
(13.09)
Ideological Extremity 11.99**
(5.65)
Incumbent Party Presidential Vote -10.07
(12.71)
Redistricting -1.90
(6.08)
Primary System -24.04**
(2.85)
Number of Challengers -6.78**
(1.69)
Quality Challenger -14.64**
(2.11)
Constant 39.69
(25.20)
N 174
R-squared 0.54
Note: Coefficients are OLS estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses.
** indicates p≤ .05, * indicates p≤ .10, two-tailed tests.
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trolling for whether they face a quality primary challenger. A 10 percent increase
in the percentage of the incumbent’s total campaign funds from high dollar donor
contributions in the previous election cycle is associated with a 2 percent increase in
the incumbent’s primary vote share. While statistically significant, the substantive
impact of high dollar donations on Republican incumbent’s primary vote share is
fairly small relative to the effect of facing a quality primary challenger on all incum-
bents’ primary vote share. These results suggest high dollar donations may foster
Republican success in the congressional primaries, but that big donor ties primarily
effect incumbent’s primary prospects by influencing the likelihood they face a quality
primary challenger.
In addition, incumbents’ primary vote share also depends on their ideological
position. A more extreme roll call voting record did not affect the chances of a quality
primary challenger emerging (see the results from Model 1 in Table 4.3), but more
extreme candidates do receive a larger primary vote share when they face a primary
challenger. A one standard deviation (.19) movement toward the ideological poles
increases incumbent candidates’ primary vote share by over 2 percent. As expected
based on prior research and the results from Model 1, the size of incumbent’s war
chest and whether they were recently involved in a scandal also exert an effect on
incumbents’ primary vote share. The amount of money incumbents raised in the
previous election exerts a weak substantive effect on their primary vote. A one
standard deviation (0.59) increase in their total campaign receipts increases their
primary vote share by less than 2 percent. There are several possible reasons for the
relatively small impact of campaign receipts on members’ electoral prospects. The
variable captures the incumbent’s fundraising ability in a previous election, which
never equals zero, the effect of receiving no high dollar donations on Democratic incumbents’
primary vote share is not meaningful and thus not discussed here.
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should be highly correlated with but not necessarily the same as their fundraising
success in the current election.14 Existing empirical evidence on the relationship
between incumbent’s fundraising totals and their vote share in congressional elections
is also mixed and may partially explain the weak effect. Scandals have a large
substantive impact, reducing incumbents’ primary vote share by over 7 percent.
Incumbent’s vote share also decreases when more challengers enter the race. The
majority of incumbents face a single challenger, but facing one additional challenger
decreases their primary vote share by almost 7 percent. Lastly, incumbent’s elec-
toral vote share is a function of the congressional primary system in their state, as
one would expect. The incumbent primary vote share is lower when incumbents
potentially face candidates from other parties in the primary election.
4.6 Conclusion
Taken together, the results from the models presented here show that not all
money is equal when it comes to congressional primaries. Campaign war chests are
thought to contribute to the incumbency advantage by deterring quality challengers.
Though there is some debate in the literature about the size of this deterrence effect,
campaign resources are generally seen as beneficial to members’ reelection prospects.
This study suggests the source of incumbents’ war chest matters. The results show
that members of Congress who rely on big-donor individuals as an important source
of campaign resources may actually be disadvantaged in the primary elections if they
are Democrats. Closer ties with high dollar donors increase the likelihood a quality
14The incumbent’s campaign fundraising totals for the current election are not included because
the amount raised by incumbents prior to the primary election is not available from the FEC
candidate summary files. Because the competitiveness of the primary election may greatly impact
how much pressure incumbents feel to raise additional funds between the primary and general
elections, the fundraising totals from the current election cycle may also be unrepresentative of
their campaign war chest at the time of the primary election. Fundraising totals from the current
and previous congressional elections both have their defects, so the total campaign receipts from
the previous election was used for greater consistency between Model 1 and Model 2.
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primary challenger runs against Democratic incumbents, adversely affecting their
primary vote share. The effect of high dollar donations on Republican incumbents
shows that the source of members’ campaign resources matters for incumbents from
both parties, but actually serves to advantage Republican candidates. Republican
incumbents who receiver a greater share of high dollar donations are less likely to
receive a quality primary challenge and receive a larger primary vote share.
These findings suggest campaign resources affect potential challengers’ decision
calculus in a more nuanced way than previously understood. The total size of in-
cumbents’ war chest deters quality primary challengers as expected, but the source
of their money also influences candidate entry. Being too reliant on high dollar
donors for campaign funds likely leads potential challengers to question whether in-
cumbents adequately represent their district constituency and perceive them as more
electorally vulnerable. Incumbent vulnerability changes potential challengers’ per-
ception of their odds of winning and their likelihood of entering the race. Large
campaign war chests can also encourage high-quality challengers to run, depending
on the composition of donors who contribute to the incumbent’s total campaign
resources.
If the pressure to constantly raise more money leads members of Congress to
cater to donors at the risk of inadequately representing their district interests, po-
litical elites—in this case, well-qualified primary challengers—can potentially hold
members accountable for the disconnect. This mechanism does not rely on voters
keeping close tabs on their representatives and directly punishing them at the next
election when they are out of step with their constituents. While evidence suggests
voters hold members of Congress accountable to some degree, particularly on salient
roll call votes, strategic challengers can ensure greater accountability. Voters do not
necessarily need to have a detailed awareness of their member’s behavior and how it
94
relates to their own preferences. Instead, accountability can occur through the strate-
gic emergence of well-qualified challengers and voters’ response to the qualifications
of candidates in the primary race.
Greater accountability does seem to occur in certain cases, at least among Demo-
cratic incumbents, but these findings raise questions about whether Republican mem-
bers also risk their reelection prospects when their campaign fundraising encourages
less responsiveness to constituency preferences. Responding to big donors may bring
Republican members into greater alignment with their primary constituency, but it
is unclear how their relationship with donors affects their representation of their dis-
trict constituency and their electoral prospects in the general election. This question
should be the topic of further research given its relevance for theories of democratic
accountability and polarization in Congress.
95
5. CONCLUSION
Members of Congress want to be reelected. This statement is uncontroversial
and members’ reelection-seeking motive factors prominently in existing explanations
of congressional behavior. The electoral connection between members of Congress
and their district constituency, who can vote members of Congress in and out of
office, creates incentives for members to respond to the preferences and needs of
their constituents. Members who fail to represent their constituents risk losing their
seat at election time when voters assess their representative’s performance and de-
cide to reward or punish their representative accordingly. While the electoral con-
nection has the potential to ensure members represent their district’s interests in
Congress, and numerous studies show such responsiveness does occur, the strength
of the representative-constituency linkage varies across districts, issues, and time.
The increasing cost of congressional elections also raises the possibility that cam-
paign donors influence congressional behavior and weaken the connection between
members and their district. As the race for campaign resources becomes more ex-
pensive and harder to win, members of Congress may be inclined to cater to the
interests of the donor class instead.
This research suggests donors do influence the way members of Congress behave
and shape the policymaking process with broader implications for representation
and party polarization in Congress. Examining the connection between campaign
contributions from wealthy individuals and the political ideology of the members
they donate to shows that these financial ties tilt policy to the ideological right.
As shown in Chapter 2, both Democrats and Republicans take more conservative
positions on roll call votes than expected given the composition of their district
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when big donors contribute a larger share of their campaign funds. Democrats with
financial ties to big donors adopt more centrist policy positions and Republicans
adopt more ideologically extreme positions. While there are certainly members on
both sides of the aisle that raise money from other sources and are less influenced
by the interests of the donor class, individual donors account for a substantial share
of the total money in congressional elections. In the 2010 congressional elections,
contributions from individual donors accounted for over 60 percent of all money
raised by U.S. House candidates.1 Donations from very aﬄuent individuals who
each contributed more than $10,000 to U.S. House and Senate candidates made
up over 24 percent of all campaign donations to congressional candidates in 2010
(Drutman 2011). The disproportionate share of campaign donations flowing from
wealthy individuals to congressional candidates does not necessarily pose a threat to
democratic responsiveness if donors share similar concerns as ordinary voters in the
districts members represent; however, the analyses in Chapter 2 indicate donors shift
members’ roll call voting to the ideological right, at least among members with strong
financial ties to big donors, even after accounting for the impact of their districts.
Empirical evidence on the political preferences and motivations of donors, par-
ticularly very wealthy individual donors, is scarce. Donors who can contribute thou-
sands of dollars to political candidates during a single election cycle are an elite
group. Nationally representative surveys provide some insights about the political
attitudes donors hold, but the sample of big donors and other wealthy individuals
is typically too small to draw strong conclusions. Recent research on the political
attitudes of the very wealthy offers some clues about the political concerns of aﬄuent
donors, however, and it suggests the political opinions of wealthy individuals differ
1Estimate based on analyses of Federal Election Commission data conducted and published by
the Campaign Finance Institute.
97
from those of ordinary voters in systematic ways. Voters across the income distribu-
tion are in agreement on many policy issues. But on several key economic and fiscal
issues, such as taxes, free trade, and corporate regulations, the political views of the
wealthy are more conservative and libertarian (Page, Bartels, and Seawright 2013;
Gilens 2012; Bramlett, Gimpel, and Lee 2011).
The main result from Chapter 2—donors tilt policy in a more conservative direc-
tion than it likely would be otherwise—aligns with the distinctive political attitudes
held by wealthy individuals. Donors’ ability to influence roll call votes, which are
highly visible and as a consequence largely dictated by party and district preferences,
also raises the possibility donors affect political outcomes in less obvious ways. Set-
ting the agenda is one area where donors may have an influence. Chapter 3 explores
donors’ impact on the legislative agenda and finds that donors affect policymaking
by influencing agenda-setting too.
Because aﬄuent voters share distinctive political preferences on economic and
fiscal issues, Chapter 3 examines the impact of donors on one crucial segment of the
policy agenda—domestic social policy. Looking at the bills members sponsor across
several key social policy issues, including health care, jobs, welfare, and housing,
shows donors also reduce the likelihood members of Congress support progressive
social policy bills at the early stages of the legislative process. While members’
connections to big donors do not affect their support for indirect social policy like tax
expenditures, members who receive more campaign money from big donors are less
likely to introduce bills that create new government programs or increase government
spending. In other words, members who rely on substantial funding from wealthy
donors are less likely to push for an expanded government role on key social policies
that redistribute wealth downward and often create more opportunities for low- and
middle-income families.
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Taken together, the analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 support the idea that, at least
in certain policy areas, policy reflects the political preferences of the donor class.
The economic resources of the donor class appears to translate into greater political
power as well, both when members of Congress cast roll call votes and when they set
the legislative agenda. Not all members of Congress are equally responsive to these
influences. The actions of members who receive a greater share of their campaign
funding from wealthy individual donors are particularly likely to reflect their dis-
tinctive political attitudes irrespective of the member’s party affiliation. It may also
be possible that particular members are more or less responsive to donor interests
at different stages of the legislative process depending on their institutional position
and ability to influence political outcomes at different points. For instance, commit-
tee chairs with ties to wealthy individual donors may be more likely to respond by
shaping the agenda to reflect donors’ policy priorities while more senior, electorally
secure members may have more latitude to respond at the roll call voting stage.
The linkage between donors and members’ legislative behavior does not imply
donors and members have a quid pro quo relationship. Though not directly tested
in this research, it is more likely that the frequent interactions members of Congress
have with donors color their political views and influence the way they approach pol-
icy. The constant pressure to raise campaign funds for their own reelection campaigns
and the party leads members to spend as much as four hours making fundraising calls
and interacting with donors each day (Klein 2013). Given the time members spend
listening to the concerns of these individuals, which is likely far more than the time
they spend directly interacting with ordinary voters from their district, it is perhaps
unsurprising that these interactions shape members’ policy positions and perception
of high-priority policies requiring government action. This effect is particularly likely
to occur among members of Congress who already receive a large share of their money
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from wealthy big donors and spend a large portion of their fundraising maintaining
relationships with this specific donor pool, rather than labor unions or other sources
of campaign funds that may express different opinions. The results in Chapters 2
and 3 are consistent with this story.
When members of Congress represent the interests of donors, they often do so
at the expense of adequately representing the political preferences of their district
constituency. But whether voters hold their representatives accountable for this
behavior is an open question. Fundraising prowess is seen as an advantage for elec-
toral candidates. Building a large war chest allows members of Congress to ward
off potential challengers and have enough resources to run a successful reelection
campaign. The results in Chapter 4 suggest, however, that the source of members’
campaign funding also matters. Chapter 4 addresses the impact big donor ties have
on members’ electoral prospects in the next cycle of congressional primaries. The
focus is on primary elections for two reasons. First, primary voters are more likely to
hold their representative accountable because primary voters tend to be politically
sophisticated and have more information about their member’s behavior. Second,
Democratic members are more likely to be punished by voters in the primary elec-
tion because primary voters should be dissatisfied with their member’s rightward
movement in response to donors.
Chapter 4 indicates that strategic, well-qualified primary challengers also influ-
ence whether members are held accountable. Democratic incumbents who receive a
larger share of their campaign money from wealthy individuals are more likely to face
a strong challenger in the congressional primaries. Strong potential primary chal-
lengers likely make the strategic decision to run against the incumbent because they
sense that big donors pull Democratic members away from the party base, increas-
ing their electoral vulnerability. In contrast, more money from big donors in the last
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election cycle actually decreases the chances strong candidates challenge Republican
incumbents in the primary election. Even when primary challengers choose to run,
Republican members with stronger ties to wealthy donors do better at the polls on
primary election day. Democratic incumbents do not benefit from these fundraising
efforts in the primary election.
The results in Chapter 4 are consistent with the evidence from Chapters 2 and
3 that shows big donors likely reinforce the preferences of the party base for Repub-
lican members but force Democratic members to balance the competing preferences
of the party base and donors, at least on a subset of policy issues. While the findings
in Chapter 4 offer further support for the results in the previous chapters, they also
raise a puzzle. Why do Democrats in Congress devote so much time and energy to
raising money from wealthy individuals if it jeopardizes their most important goal—
reelection? This research does not explore the effect big donor ties have on House
incumbents’ electoral success in the general election, but the need to have sufficient
campaign resources for the general election is probably a key consideration in mem-
bers’ decision calculus. Though it is purely speculative at this point, Democratic
members may be willing to risk some electoral disadvantages in the primaries, which
are often won by large margins even when strong challengers run, to solidify their
success in the general election. In contrast, Republican incumbents who rely on big
donors as an important source of funding may actually face tougher general election
challengers, but this possibility remains to be explored in future research.
Overall, this research shows how campaign financing and the race for resources
create a connection between wealthy donors and members of Congress, shifting policy
in a more conservative direction on key economic and government spending issues.
Studies of the role of money in politics have looked for evidence of its influence for
decades, but evidence of its impact on political outcomes has been largely elusive.
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In contrast to this research, however, previous work has focused almost entirely on
political giving by organized interests and its impact on roll call votes.
This research makes two contributions to our understanding of the relationship
between campaign finance and congressional behavior. First, unlike the vast majority
of previous research, this research focuses on wealthy individual donors not political
action committees (PACs) or other organized interests. PACs, corporations, and
interest groups are important players in campaign finance but contributions from
individual donors make the majority of all campaign funds raised by members of
Congress during an election. The extent to which individual donors represent as
diverse political preferences as PACs is also less well understood but early evidence
suggests they may not.
Second, this research shows that campaign finance, particularly money raised
from wealthy individuals, influences political outcomes in more nuanced ways. In-
dividual donors do not necessarily influence how members vote on a specific bill.
Instead, the findings in Chapter 2 and 3 are consistent with the idea that individual
donors shape members’ overall ideological leanings and policy priorities across roll
call votes and particularly on economic and fiscal policy issues. The influence of
donors on political outcomes also occurs at earlier stages of the political process and
in less visible ways than previously examined. Big donors exert power on the political
agenda and the types of policies considered by Congress by increasing members’ sup-
port for the status quo over creating new government programs and spending. This
research demonstrates that campaign donors have a more hidden influence than pre-
viously understood. Additional alternative pathways through which donors influence
political outcomes should be explored further. This approach is likely to be more
fruitful than searching for evidence of a direct impact or quid pro quo relationship.
The influence of wealthy donors on political outcomes and policymaking may
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be even stronger today than this research suggests. The data used in the analyses
throughout the dissertation capture the period shortly prior to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. Citizens United
changed the financial landscape of elections in several key ways. The Court ruling
struck down a provision of the McCain-Feingold Act that prohibited labor unions
and corporations from making independent expenditures for electioneering commu-
nications, such as television ads in support or against candidates. It did not alter
limitations on direct contributions to candidates or political parties by labor unions
or corporations, or change any limitations on how much individual donors can con-
tribute. While the ruling did not lift contribution limits placed on individual donors
who are the focus of this research, Citizens United and the related court decisions
that followed (SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission in particular) opened
the door for the rise of super PACs and allowed tax-exempt 501(c)(4) political ad-
vocacy groups to make political expenditures.
Individual donors can contribute an unlimited amount of money to super PACs.
Because super PACs are technically independent, they cannot make direct contribu-
tions to candidates or political parties, however, they can spend money to expressly
support or oppose political candidates. Super PACs provide another way for very
aﬄuent individuals to use their economic resources to influence political outcomes.
In that respect, the Citizens United decision is likely to exacerbate the rightward tilt
of American politics in response to the interests of the donor class. But it is also too
soon to conclude these changes in campaign finance will make members of Congress
more sympathetic to the political preferences of wealthy donors. As super PACs
continue to grow, it will be important to understand how successfully they engage
congressional members and substitute or complement for members’ more traditional
campaign organizations. These factors will likely determine how much pressure mem-
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bers feel to align themselves with super PACs and advance the policies super PACs
support.
The ideological leanings of the organized groups and donors who take advantage
of these new opportunities to influence politics through independent expenditures
will also affect how Citizens United and the related court rulings impact political
outcomes. Organized interests who engage in more political activity as a result of
these court decisions may have a more diverse set of policy preferences and attempt
to influence the political process in different ways than the individual donors studied
here. Only two congressional elections have occurred since the Citizens United deci-
sion in early 2010. Tracking the amount of outside money, the ideological diversity of
the donors and organized groups who contribute outside money, and the interaction
between members of Congress and outside groups over time will help determine just
how much the changes in campaign finance have altered the political game and their
impact on member behavior and the policymaking process. The flood of political
independent expenditures in the 2012 election certainly suggests wealthy individuals
and organized interests now have another tool to influence political outcomes. The
extent to which these interests represent a range of political perspectives will deter-
mine whether the increase in political spending further contributes to the disconnect
between members of Congress and ordinary voters.
In addition to contributing to our understanding of the role of money in congres-
sional politics, this research also has implications for the dramatic increase in party
polarization observed over the past few decades. Party polarization often implies
the widening ideological gap between the two major parties in American politics is
the result of both Democrats and Republicans moving outward to the ideological
extremes. But over the past two decades, Republicans have moved away from the
ideological center at a pace unmatched by congressional Democrats. This research
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offers an additional explanation for why asymmetric polarization occurred.
Within the Republican party, the political preferences of party activists, pri-
mary voters, and donors are likely in greater alignment than they are within the
Democratic party. This alignment reinforces the rightward ideological movement
of Republican members because this movement increases electoral support among
multiple constituencies simultaneously. In contrast, this research suggests Demo-
cratic members who respond to the preferences of primary voters, party activists,
and other forces that encourage them to adopt more extreme ideological positions
may jeopardize their campaign fundraising efforts. The findings imply Democratic
members who take more centrist positions than their district partisans and primary
voters would perhaps prefer may have more trouble cultivating and maintaining re-
lationships with wealthy donors who are an important source of campaign funding.
Polarization makes it less likely new government spending is authorized and more
likely the status quo is maintained. In addition, the asymmetric nature of polar-
ization makes it less likely Democratic representatives in Congress provide a liberal
counterbalance to the increasingly conservative policies preferred by the Republican
Party.
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL MODEL SPECIFICATIONS FOR SECTION 2
The campaign finance variables that measure the share of members’ campaign
funds contributed by wealthy individual donors are the key independent variables
used throughout this research. Members’ legislative behavior, specifically their ide-
ological moderation as demonstrated by their roll call voting, is assumed to vary
depending on the share of donations members receive from big donors. The analyses
in Chapter 2 suggest members who receive a larger share of their campaign funds
from big donors do vote differently on U.S. House roll call votes than expected given
the composition of their district. Democratic members of Congress who receive a
greater share of donations from big donors are pushed to the ideological center, while
Republican members who receive a greater share from these donors tend to be more
ideologically extreme. The campaign finance variables are also used in Chapter 3
to examine the relationship between campaign contributions from wealthy individ-
ual donors and the types of bills individual members of Congress introduce, and in
Chapter 4 to examine the impact of campaign funding sources on members’ primary
election prospects.
One potential concern is that the campaign finance variables, which are intended
as measures of members’ reliance on wealthy individual donors as an important
campaign funding source, may vary for other reasons. Both variables are constructed
as percentages. They measure the total dollar amount each member received in large
contributions from individual donors as a percentage of the total money raised from
all individual donors and the total dollar amount each member received in large
contributions from individual donors as a percentage of the total money raised from
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all sources during that election cycle. Because members’ financial ties to big donors
is measured relative to campaign funds raised from other sources, changes in the
campaign finance variables may also reflect variation in contributions from the party
or PACs.
To control for the possibility the relationship between big donor donations and
congressional behavior reflects variation in funding from PACs rather than large in-
dividual contributions, the analysis presented in Table A.1 includes PAC donations
as a control variable alongside the campaign finance variables used throughout the
chapters. While the PAC variable is statistically significant—candidates who receive
more PAC money have more moderate roll call voting records—the key campaign
finance measures are still significant as well and have the expected impact on ideo-
logical extremity. In fact, the coefficient estimates for the campaign finance variables
in Table A.1 are remarkably similar to the coefficients reported in Table 2.3. This
analysis provides additional reassurance about the relationships found between big
donor contributions and congressional behavior.
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Table A.1: The Impact of High Dollar Donations on Ideological Positioning with
Political Action Committee (PAC) Contributions Modeled Separately
Variable Individuals Only All Sources
Partisan Base 0.418* 0.400*
(.072) (0.072)
General Electorate Extremism 0.113* 0.121*
(0.032) (0.032)
Primary Electorate Extremism 0.134* 0.141*
(0.026) (0.026)
Vote Margin 0.025 0.027
(0.038) (0.037)
High Dollar Donations 0.118*
(as % of donations from individuals) (0.052)
High Dollar Donations 0.191*
(as % of total funds) (0.069)
PAC Donations -0.866* -0.763*
(in tens of thousands) (0.238) (.231)
Democrat 0.016 0.006
(0.32) (0.025)
Donations*Democrat -0.212* -0.339*
(0.061) (0.082)
Constant -0.498* -0.542*
(0.089) (0.089)
N 826 826
R-squared 0.44 0.45
Note: Coefficients are OLS estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* indicates p≤ .05, two-tailed tests.
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APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL MODEL SPECIFICATIONS FOR SECTION 3
The analyses in Chapter 2 measured members’ reliance on campaign contribu-
tions from big donors in two different ways. The first measure is the percentage of
overall campaign funds raised from individual big donors and the second measure is
the percentage of campaign funds raised from all individual donors that came from
individual big donors. Though the models in Chapter 2 use both specifications of
the campaign finance variable, the analyses in the subsequent chapters only include
the first measure for the sake of brevity.
The models presented in Table B.1 are identical to the models presented in Table
3.2 with one exception—they include the measure of large individual contributions as
a percentage of all individual contributions rather than overall campaign funds. Both
measures yield the same substantive results. In particular, receiving a greater share
of contributions from high dollar donors decreases the likelihood members introduce
direct spending bills, but has no impact on the number of indirect policy bills they
sponsor.
The negative binomial count models presented in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 examine
the relationship between financial ties to big donors and the number of direct and
indirect policy bills members of Congress introduce. These models control for each
member’s overall level of activity on social policy issues by including the number of
social policy bills they introduce as a control variable. An alternative approach is
modeling the relative time members of Congress devote to direct and indirect policy
bills as a percentage of the total number of social policy bills they introduce that
are either direct or indirect. This specification is an alternative way to capture the
120
Table B.1: The Effect of High Dollar Donors on the Policy Tools Members Choose
with High Dollar Donations Measured as a Percentage of All Individual Donations
Variable Direct Tools Indirect Tools
Social Policy Bills Introduced 0.15* 0.15*
(0.02) (0.02)
Percent in Poverty 0.21 -1.69
(0.64) (1.21)
Percent Under Age 18 2.07 -2.84
(1.48) (2.69)
Percent Elderly 0.55 -1.78
(1.40) (3.08)
Democratic Presidential Vote 0.41 1.03
(0.32) (0.59)
Ideology -0.47* 0.66*
(0.13) (0.17)
High Dollar Donations -0.53* -0.17
(0.22) (0.31)
Majority Party Member 0.17* -0.02
(0.05) (0.09)
Leadership 0.04 0.24
(0.10) (0.18)
Committee Member 0.21* -0.05
(0.08) (0.15)
Ways & Means Member 0.36*
(0.16)
Seniority -0.01 -0.05*
(0.01) (0.02)
Constant -0.90 -0.43
(0.53) (1.04)
N 851 851
Log Likelihood -1284.29 -772.71
Wald χ2 488.8* 136.4*
Note: Coefficients are negative binomial regression estimates.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* indicates p≤ .05, two-tailed tests.
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relative amount of time and resources members spend sponsoring different types of
bills.
Table B.2 contains the results from two ordinary least squares regression models
that take this approach. The dependent variable in the first model is the percentage
of social policy bills each member introduced that were direct policy bills, and the
dependent variable in the second model is the percentage of social policy bills that
were indirect policy bills. A count of the number of bills of either type that members
introduced was excluded from the right-hand side of the model because it is the
denominator for the dependent variables. The models in Table B.2 yield similar
substantive conclusions as the models in Table 3.2 for the main variables of interest:
high dollar donations and ideology; however, some of the control variables that were
significant in the Table 3.2 models, namely the committee membership variables, no
longer have a statistically significant effect on member bill sponsorship patterns.
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Table B.2: The Effect of High Dollar Donors on the Policy Tools Members Choose
with Tool Choice Measured as a Percentage
Variable Direct Tools Indirect Tools
Percent in Poverty 0.06 -0.30*
(0.26) (0.15)
Percent Under Age 18 0.52 -0.29
(0.60) (0.36)
Percent Elderly -0.26 -0.27
(0.57) (0.39)
Democratic Presidential Vote 0.11 0.11
(0.14) (0.08)
Ideology -0.19* 0.07*
(0.04) (0.03)
High Dollar Donations -0.33* -0.04
(0.09) (0.07)
Majority Party Member 0.06* 0.00
(0.02) (0.01)
Leadership -0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.03)
Committee Member 0.05 0.00
(0.03) (0.02)
Ways & Means Member 0.03
(0.03)
Seniority -0.00 -0.01*
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.31 0.26
(0.23) (0.14)
N 851 851
R-squared 0.12 0.04
Note: Coefficients are OLS estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* indicates p≤ .05, two-tailed tests.
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